SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION: OCEAN COUNTY INDICTMENT NO. 03-12-1607 APPELLATE NO. A-

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Complainant,

VS.

ROBERT J. WIKANDER,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF RESENTENCE

PLACE:

Ocean County Courthouse

120 Hooper Avenue

Toms River, New Jersey

DATE:

January 30, 2008

BEFORE:

THE HON. FRANCIS R. HODGSON, JR., J.S.C.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

CLAIRE DRUGACH, ESQ. (Office of the Public Defender, Appellate Section)

## APPEARANCES:

DEBORAH S. HANLON-SCHRON, ESQ. Assistant Prosecutor Attorney for the State

FREDERICK SISTO, ESQ. Assistant Deputy Public Defender Attorney for the Defendant

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INDEX

IDENT.

EVID.

3	RESENTENCE	<u>PAGE</u>
4	By: Mr. Sisto	4
5	By: Mr. Wikander	12
6	By: Ms. Hanlon-Schron	13
7	By: The Court	13

**EXHIBITS** 

(No exhibits marked.)

1	THE COURT: All right. Prosecutor, ready		
2	matter?		
3	MS. HANLON-SCHRON: Judge, the next matter we		
4	have ready is State versus Robert Wikander.		
5	THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Sisto.		
6	MR. SISTO: Good afternoon, your Honor.		
7	THE COURT: Did you have an opportunity to		
8	review the appeal rights form with your client?		
9	MR. SISTO: I have, your Honor. And he's		
10	executed it and it's in the possession of the Court.		
11	THE COURT: Okay. Now, just for		
12	clarification, this is a remand from an appeal entered		
13	by the Appellate Division, an order dated		
14	December 10th, 2008. The order was received and filed		
15	December 24th, 2008, remanding for the Court to		
16	articulate specific reasons as to the consecutive		
17	sentence. The sentence as it existed otherwise was		
18	left unchanged.		
19	Is that your understanding?		
20	MR. SISTO: It is, your Honor.		
21	THE COURT: All right. Have you had an		
22	opportunity to speak with your client about this?		
23	MR. SISTO: I have, your Honor. We spoke		
24	during the video conference and we spoke today briefly		
25	when he entered the courtroom.		

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THE COURT: All right. I'll hear you.

MR. SISTO: Thank you, your Honor. Obviously we're here to request that Mr. Wikander be resentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration, for relevant considerations under Yarbough as follows:

One. Whether the crimes in their objectives were predominantly independent of each other. And we're submitting that this can't be said in this case because, frankly, we're submitting that there was no objective at all to the senseless act that was committed by Mr. Wikander. Again, by no objective we mean no purpose. Mr. Wikander's convictions are based on reckless conduct and review of his plea colloquy back in 2003, I believe, and also the relevant second-degree statute notes that it's supported again by reckless conduct as opposed to conduct that was purposeful or conduct that had any objective. No one has ever alleged it was this man's purpose to cause the terrible harm that he did.

With that in mind, we're submitting there were no objectives to these crimes, and if somehow the Court finds that there were, we submit that the objectives were not predominantly independent of each other. Thus, we ask the Court to consider and find that the first factor should weigh heavily in favor of

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a concurrent sentence, concurrent sentences rather.

Regarding the second factor, whether the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence, we noted the Appellate Division noted in their remand order that both crimes stem from the same While we concede the obvious that there were separate two distinct and innocent victims in this case, the crimes involved a single accident and a single act of violence. And again the act of violence was a terrible one, but it can't be fairly said that the victims' simultaneous injuries involved separate acts or separate threats of violence. The number of victims is separate and distinct. As per the Yarbough considerations, we submit that it would be double counting to find that whenever there is or just in this case because there's more than one victim that there would be more than one threat or act of violence. Again, we ask the Court to consider that the second factor also weighs in favor of the concurrent sentences.

Regarding the third factor, whether the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior, again as supported by the record and noted

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by the Appellate Division, these crimes stem from the same incident and occurred at the same time and place and occurred essentially simultaneously. It's beyond dispute that they were committed at the same time and place. As such, we submit that the third factor should weigh heavily in favor of concurrent sentences.

With respect to the fourth <u>Yarbough</u> consideration, whether any of the crimes involved multiple victims, certainly here there was more than one victim, but it does require some analysis with respect to what the New Jersey Supreme Court meant by multiple victims. It would have made it clear if they had just said more than one victim, then it would be obvious here, but one definition of multiple means involving several or many, another one, more than one.

Again we can concede that this one can cut both ways or could cut towards the State but we'd like to Court to consider the following, that particularly some of the progeny since <u>Yarbough</u>, two cases in particular, <u>Carey</u> and <u>Molina</u>, would appear to support the State's position, in light of their holdings that consecutive sentences are appropriate where a defendant causes multiple deaths or serious injuries, multiple persons. That still doesn't resolve what the term multiple means. And we're submitting that based

on those two cases, both <u>Carey</u> and <u>Molina</u>, they support the assertion, at least in part, that the term multiple means more than one, or rather more than two, I should say, strike that. <u>Molina</u> involves six victims, two who died, four who suffered injuries, <u>Carey</u> involved four victims, two who died and two who suffered grave injuries.

The facts in this case again lends support to the definition of multiple, that means more than two victims, which is not the case here with Mr. Wikander's pleas. Again, we submit that this factor should go towards imposing concurrent sentences but we concede that it could cut both ways and we ask only that if the Court does weigh this factor in favor of consecutive sentences that it not be given great weight in light of differences that I outlined between this case and <u>Carey</u> and <u>Molina</u>.

The fifth and final enumerated factor in Yarbough is whether conviction for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous. Again, we're confronted with the term numerous that we need to define before we conduct an analysis, and I think that the common thread running between every definition of the word numerous is that it involves a large and indefinite number. We're submitting there's an

obvious incongruence between the number two, the innocent victims in this case, and a large indefinite number. And with that in mind, again we note he's only pleaded guilty to two offenses, we have two convictions, we submit that that is not a numerous number of convictions and we submit that factor 5 should weigh in favor of a concurrent sentence or concurrent sentences.

The other Yarbough criteria is that:

- 1. There can be no free crimes in a system for which the punishment shall fit the crime;
- There shall be no double counting of aggravating factors;
- 3. Successive terms from the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first offense.

With respect to the first consideration, we ask the Court to consider that even if Mr. Wikander's sentences were to run concurrently, we submit he would not be given what could appropriately be termed a free crime here. His court history is still going to reflect two separate convictions, against two separate innocent victims. These offenses represent his first and only convictions of any kind as evidenced by the presence of mitigating factor 7 in the JOC, thus, he

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essentially lived a completely law-abiding life for some 39 years before this terrible accident, this terrible tragedy occurred.

From speaking with him, I can represent to the Court that his remorse is obvious to me. I believe that when he is eventually released from prison that the man is going to too terrified to even drive a car, let alone commit another crime. But in the unlikely event that I'm incorrect, he understands that if he ever appears before a judge again, his court history is going to reflect two separate convictions with two separate victims and that's going to weigh heavily in aggravation of any potential future sentence that is handed down to Mr. Wikander.

The point is again that we're asking for concurrent sentences, but we submit that if concurrent sentences are handed down, it's not going to be correct to term the disposition as a free crime in any way, shape or form. Moreover, a 7-year concurrent sentence with an 85 percent parole disqualifier which is what we're asking for despite his lack of any prior record and never intended to harm anyone, he must still spend 2,172 days in prison before he can even be considered for parole. He's presently sentenced to serve twice that number of days before he would be

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considered for parole. And it's worth noting that the sentence is significantly longer than the sentences that were handed down in the aforementioned cases of <a href="Carey">Carey</a> and <a href="Molina">Molina</a>, despite the fact that those cases involve deaths and numerous victims and convictions which are not the cases here.

Regarding whether or not there was a double counting of aggravating factors, we submit that there was not, but we'd like the Court to note the following: The Yarbough Court explained that where the essential element of a crime is a specific fact, that element may not be used as an aggravating factor to impose a custodial sentence that is longer than the presumptive term or to impose parole ineligibility.

Again we're not arguing that this factor was violated but it's worth noting here that while these sentences do not go above the presumptive terms, he was essentially sentenced to consecutive terms that under this rule were as harsh as possible without running afoul of the rule. Under <a href="Natale">Natale</a>, could be sentenced to effectively consecutive maximum terms for someone like Mr. Wikander with no prior record who did not admit to any of the other aggravating factors at the time of his plea.

With respect to the Court's final holding

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that successive terms for the same offense should not ordinarily can be equal to the punishment for the first offense, Mr. Wikander's sentence would appear to violate this rule unless your Honor finds or the Court finds that there was the presence of extraordinary circumstances.

In light of the foregoing and particularly that the number of victims and the number of convictions were not numerous, we're submitting that there is no extraordinary circumstances, as well as the fact that again he has no prior record, and we ask that if the Court is inclined to affirm consecutive sentences, that he be sentenced to or his sentence be reduced upon resentencing from consecutive 7's to a 7 with a consecutive 5 or 6.

Finally, I draw the Court's attention to some of the language in <u>Yarbough</u> that spoke to the purposeful and heinous acts that were committed by the defendants in that case as opposed to the reckless and unintentional act with still terrible outcome that was committed by Mr. Wikander. The Court wrote, "Their conduct would test the capacity of the most resolute judges to focus on the code's grading of the crime and not the criminal and fashionless sentence." And I think even though there's stark differences between

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Mr. Wikander and the defendants in <u>Yarbough</u>, that passage, it speaks volumes to what's occurred here. It's nearly impossible for anyone, including myself or the prosecutor and I would imagine your Honor, to conduct an objective and detached analysis when we're talking about a case where two innocent young girls were severely seriously injured and nearly died. But that is what the law requires. The law asks us to be objective and to be fair and that there be some type of consistency in different sentences.

And with that said, in light of the foregoing, we're requesting that Mr. Wikander be resentenced to concurrent terms.

THE COURT: All right. Robert Wikander, do you have anything to say before I sentence you?

THE DEFENDANT: Only that I'm, I remain sorry, your Honor, I remain working on myself, I continue to take programs in prison and go to AA in the prison. I have counseling one-on-one and group therapy at the prison. I continue to try to work on myself and insure that this never reoccurs again. I have said that I am sorry to the Hernandez girls and although those are, you know, those are genuine and they are sincere, my actions are the only things that will speak louder than my words.

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THE COURT: All right. Prosecutor?

MS. HANLON-SCHRON: Judge, I won't be long and I certainly won't be as eloquent as counsel.

This matter was remanded by the Appellate Division to come back for this Court to really reconsider the record below and to really amplify the record with regard to whether or not a consecutive sentence is appropriate. It is the State's position that the sentence imposed by the Court below originally was the correct sentence. It's the State's position that nothing has changed since that point in time. It is the State's position that there is ample support in the record for this Court to reimpose the consecutive sentences which were imposed by the judge in this case originally and the State would submit to this Court's discretion.

THE COURT: All right. Robert Wikander, you have 45 days from today to appeal from this resentence the Court is about to impose.

I would just note that again for the record that this matter is before the Court on resentence from an order in the Appellate Division from December 24th, 2008 which questioned the reasons for Judge Citta's consecutive treatment of two aggravated assault charges in the indictment. The Appellate

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Division remanded the matter so that this Court could provide, as the Appellate Division indicated, a detailed statement of reasons for the imposition of consecutive sentences.

And with that regard, I should note for the record that it is my purpose only to amplify and supplement what was Judge Citta's sentencing, specifically and only with regard to those consecutive sentences and why the consecutive sentences were issued.

I would note as mentioned that the crime did involve separate victims and I think it's worth restating what are the facts of that matter.

Defendant while intoxicated drove onto the sidewalk in a suburban area about 7:30 p.m. in the evening and struck two sisters, the victims, RH and MH. The persons at the scene described the defendant's vehicle because he wasn't there, he had left, fled the scene. The person at the scene indicated that they were familiar with this vehicle and that this person frequents the area to buy drugs. The police a short time later found the defendant and his vehicle a short distance away from where the incident had occurred. The vehicle was disabled and the defendant was attempting to try to pay somebody to change a flat

tire on the front right of his vehicle. The defendant had two bags of cocaine in his possession and was intoxicated at this time.

As I've indicated, there were two victims in this matter, both of them were seriously injured. At the time RH was a 10-year-old girl, she fractured, as a result of this, her pelvis was fractured and her knee was injured as well as numerous other what would be termed minor injuries compared to those two serious injuries. MH, an 11-year-old girl, at the time was 11 years old, had a complex depressed skull fracture, multiple facial fractures and a radius fracture. Both of these girls were seriously injured.

I give very great weight to that factor in Yarbough, there are two separate victims and there should be no free crimes. And this is in accord with State vs. Carey, 168 New Jersey 413 at Pages 427 and 431, a 2001 case, and State vs. Molina, 168 New Jersey 436 at Pages 441 and 443, a 2001 case, decided on the same day.

The sentences, the consecutive sentences are appropriate and I'm going to reimpose the consecutive sentences as they are imposed. The reasons for giving the consecutive sentences are well supported by the facts and are, as I have just indicated, involving two

victims and supported by <u>Yarbough</u> and that there should be no free crimes. The sentence remains as Judge Citta had indicated.

(End of matter.)

CERTIFICATE

I, Karen L. Schantz-Hulse, C.C.R., License
Number XI01263, C.R.R., License Number 30XR00017400,
an Official Court Reporter in and for the State of New
Jersey, do hereby certify that the foregoing to be
prepared in full compliance with the current
Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a
true and accurate non-compressed transcript to the
best of my knowledge and ability.

KARENLL. SCHANTZ-HULSE, G.C.R., C.R.R.
Dated: 340009

Official Court Reporter
Ocean County Courthouse