The more difficult issue is whether a particular joint motion establishes “good cause,” a term left undefined by the Rule, for sentence modification. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.3 on R. 3:21-10 (2022) (noting the “provision does not undertake to either define or to illustrate ‘good cause’ in this context,” but suggesting an appropriate situation may be a defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement after the time limit in Rule 3:21-10(a), sixty days after conviction, expired) (citing Report of the Committee on Criminal Practice, 98 N.J.L.J. Index Pg. 344 (1975)).
We have construed the phrase “good cause” on several occasions, utilizing similar standards. See, e.g., Ghandi v. Cespedes, (App. Div. 2007) (explaining that “‘good cause’ is an amorphous term, that is, it ‘is difficult of precise delineation. Its application requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case considered in the context of the purposes of the Court Rule being applied.'”) In Estate of Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (App. Div. 2018) we applied similar reasoning in deciding whether there was good cause under a statute, section 17(c) of the Wiretap Act, to disclose the contents of intercepted communications. We noted that “a trial court’s determination of ‘good cause’ involves weighing the need for disclosure against the harm disclosure is likely to cause.”
The Lagano case was brought by the survivors of the aggrieved party. The aggrieved was likely an innocent party who was monitored while speaking with a target during a wiretap investigation. Surviving family would then bring the lawsuit on the decedent’s behalf after his or her death.