The New Jersey Supreme Court continued: The two Draeger-manufactured probes fail to meet the NIST’s standards and the measure of uncertainty in their temperature readings is unknown. The Court does not accept the State’s contention that the risk of miscalibration is infinitesimal due to the numerous other fail-safes in the calibration procedure. As Dr. Brettell […]
Alcotest Calibration Thermometers (Part 4)
Justice Timpone continued: Based on the credible testimony, the Special Master determined that accurate temperature readings of the simulator solutions are “the foundation upon which the entire calibration process is built.” The Special Master found NIST traceability “essential” to confidence in the Alcotest’s results and that the two Draeger-manufactured probes were not NIST-traceable and were […]
Alcotest Calibration Thermometers (Part 3)
The New Jersey Supreme Court continued: The Special Master’s findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, and the Court adopts them. Breath test results produced by Alcotest machines not calibrated using a NIST-traceable thermometer are inadmissible. This case is justiciable despite defendant’s passing. The Court will entertain a case that has become […]
Alcotest Calibration Thermometers (Part 2)
Justice Timpone continued: Marc W. Dennis, a coordinator in the New Jersey State Police’s Alcohol Drug Testing Unit, was tasked with performing the semi-annual calibrations on Alcotest instruments used in Middlesex, Monmouth, Ocean, Somerset, and Union Counties. He is charged with neglecting to take required measurements and having falsely certified that he followed the calibration […]
Alcotest Calibration Thermometers (Part 1)
On November 13, 2018, the New Jersey Supreme court decided the Monmouth County case of State v. Eileen Cassidy. Justice Timpone wrote for a unanimous court. The principal issue was whether alcohol breath test readings could be admitted into evidence if the machines were calibrated by a thermometer that was not approved in the seminal […]
Driving While Suspended for Second DUIs or Refusals (Part 3)
“When N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 was enacted in 2009, the Senate intended to lodge ‘criminal penalties for persons whose drivers’ licenses are suspended for certain drunk driving offenses and who, while under suspension for those offenses, unlawfully operate a motor vehicle.’” The phrase “certain drunk driving offenses” is not limited to one category of offense. It necessarily […]
Driving While Suspended for Second DUIs or Refusals (Part 2)
The analysis in Ciancaglini and Frye focuses on well-established rules of statutory construction as applied to the particular law under consideration. That methodology informs our discussion. In interpreting a statute, the primary goal is, as always, “to divine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” We consider the enactment’s plain language, viewed in the context of the […]
Driving While Suspended for Second DUIs or Refusals (Part 1)
On July 10, 2018, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Burlington County case of State v. James Dougherty. The principal issue before the Court was whether a defendant could be convicted of fourth-degree driving while suspended for a second or subsequent DWI or refusal conviction when he was previously convicted of a single DWI and […]
Taillights and Motor Vehicle Stops: Part 5
A number of states have subsequently adopted Heien‘s holding. Importantly, however, a number of states have either followed or acknowledged Justice Kagan’s narrow interpretation of an objectively reasonable mistake of law. In State v. Scriven, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether to adopt Heien. The officer’s mistake of law […]
Taillights and Motor Vehicle Stops: Part 4
In Heien, the United States Supreme Court considered a police officer’s reasonable but erroneous interpretation of a motor vehicle statute. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion noted that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” After explaining that “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect,” and that the Fourth Amendment allows for reasonable […]