On June 16, 2025, a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court decided the Camden County case of In re the Matter Concerning the State Grand Jury (A-15-24) (089571). The principal issue concerned a trial court’s declining to empanel a special grand jury and finding that an “anticipated presentment concerning clergy abuse within the Catholic Church is not authorized by law.”
Chief Justice Rabner wrote for the Court in relevant part: The trial court outlined its reasoning as to why a special grand jury should not be empaneled and could not return a presentment on the topic. The reasons included the commitment of time and resources to empanel grand jurors free of bias; the financial hardship that would be imposed on jurors selected; and the fact that “priests are not public officials and the Catholic Church is not a public entity,” such that the presentment would not “relate to public affairs or conditions” under Rule 3:6-9(a). The trial court also observed that the “promised presentment” would be “fundamentally unfair.” The court explained that anyone accused in the document would not have the right to challenge an allegation in the way a defendant charged by indictment can, and would not have the protections that Rule 3:6-9(c) affords public officials before a presentment is released. The trial court additionally found that the “intended historical review of sexual abuse allegations against Catholic priests” was not a matter of imminent concern under the case law. The State appealed, and the Appellate Division summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification. The relevant case law and court rule on presentments contemplate the existence of both a grand jury investigation and an actual presentment for an assignment judge to review. But here, no grand jury has completed an investigation, and no presentment exists. Courts cannot presume the outcome of an investigation in advance or the contents of a presentment that has not yet been written. It was therefore premature for the trial court to conclude that any potential presentment in this matter had to be suppressed. The State has the right to proceed with its investigation and present evidence before a special grand jury. If the grand jury issues a presentment, the assignment judge should review the report and publish it if it complies with the legal standards outlined in the Court’s opinion. The Court cannot and does not decide the ultimate question in advance.
Article I, Paragraph 8 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that “no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” Several decisions of the Court expound on the meaning, and explain the contours, of a grand jury presentment: In re Presentment by Camden Cnty. Grand Jury (Camden I), 10 N.J. 23 (1952); In re Presentments by Monmouth Cnty. Grand Jury (Monmouth), 24 N.J. 318 (1957); In re Presentment by Camden Cnty. Grand Jury (Camden II), 34 N.J. 378 (1961). (p. 10) 2. Camden I thoroughly canvassed the history of grand jury presentments. The opinion summarized hundreds of subjects grand juries commented on, including conduct by public bodies, institutions, and officials as well as conduct by non-governmental actors that related to public affairs and conditions.
The Court responded to the “chief objection” to the use of grand jury presentments — namely, “that a public official or even a private citizen who is in some way associated with public affairs . may not be afforded an opportunity to answer” the criticism leveled against them — explaining that “the danger is not confined to presentments” and that various protections applied to the issuance of presentments. The Court cautioned against the selection of grand juries “on a partisan basis,” which can lead to “partisan presentments,” and emphasized that the assignment judge’s “acceptance of a presentment is not a ministerial act;” it is a judicial one. The Court stated that if a grand jury should “bring in a false presentment out of partisan motives, or indulge in personalities without basis,” the assignment judge has the “power to strike the presentment or as much thereof as is palpably untrue.” Those statements are reflected in Rule 3:6-9.
Five years later, the Supreme Court addressed two presentments that “the assignment judge refused to file and ordered stricken.” Monmouth, 24 N.J. at 320. One related to “the sale and publication of obscene and indecent literature,” a matter that did not involve public entities or officials. The other recommended empowering municipal courts “to hear cases involving desertion and nonsupport.” The Court found that “[t]he presentments in question spoke of common problems prevailing to an extent demanding added official attention.” It emphasized that the assignment judge’s right to suppress presentments “should be sparingly exercised and exerted only where the matters returned are clearly and unquestionably contrary to the public good” and directed that the presentments under review be filed and published.
In Camden II, the Court reviewed a grand jury presentment about gambling activity and police protection of that conduct. In addressing the function and appropriate limits of presentments, the Court reiterated the governing standard: “A grand jury may investigate conditions or offenses affecting the morals, health, sanitation, or general welfare of the county. The subject must be a matter of public interest, or relate to some aspect of public affairs, or to some public evil or condition to which, in the discretion of the jury, the attention of the community should be directed.” The Court’s summary does not mention “imminence.” The Camden II Court focused in large part on the limits and considerations that apply to the censure of a public official in a presentment. It found that two parts of the presentment before it should have been suppressed and remanded a third part for examination.
The Court reviews the history and text of Rule 3:6-9. None of the Court’s seminal cases on presentments address hypothetical grand jury reports. The cases all involve actual reports that can be reviewed and examined to determine whether they satisfy the applicable legal standards. The Court Rule reflects that as well. Each step of the process it sets forth envisions an actual presentment, returned by a sitting grand jury, which can then be reviewed. No case law or court rule authorizes a judge to evaluate a hypothetical or potential presentment. It is simply premature to determine whether a presentment that has not yet been written, like the “anticipated presentment” here, should be suppressed.
When an actual presentment is “clearly and unquestionably contrary to the public good,” assignment judges have the authority to strike it. Monmouth, 24 N.J. at 325. But even then, as the Court noted more than a half century ago, the power to suppress should be used “sparingly.” Here, the trial court’s ruling relied in part on the amount of time and resources needed to select and empanel a grand jury. That is not a relevant factor under the case law. Certain other findings of the trial court address the substance of a hypothetical presentment in this matter. The Court does not reach those additional findings, which are also premature. The Court vacates the trial court’s analysis relating to the propriety of the proposed presentment in this case. There was no legal basis to decline to empanel a special grand jury or to suppress a potential grand jury presentment here.
The Appellate Division’s summary affirmance of the trial court’s decision shows how procedural Law is just as important as substantive law. The entire New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the trial court’s decision was incorrect and had no basis in precedent. Yet, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court. This is likely since the Appellate Division was not required to provide a detailed analysis for their decision to affirm. A decision to reverse the trial court required the time and resources that are evidenced by the Supreme Court’s opinion. In any given case, there is a temptation to adopt the decision that requires the least effort.