This is the precise type of permissible, discretionary sentencing envisioned by Blakely and Booker that does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Defendant — like every citizen who is presumed to know the law — knew that conspiring to distribute a large quantity of cocaine exposed him to a potential sentence of ten years with a five-year parole disqualifier. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309. The sentence imposed — an eight-year term with a four-year parole disqualifier — fell within the range authorized by the jury’s verdict and the applicable statute.
Admittedly, without the finding of an aggravating factor — just a single step in the sentencing process — a mandatory-minimum term cannot be sustained under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b). The same is true for a sentence at the top of the ordinary range under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2). This Court could not uphold, as reasonable, a sentence at the very top of the range for a drug offense without the finding of at least one aggravating factor. That is, if the defendant is a first-time offender, who is not likely to reoffend, and the need for deterrence is not present — the imposition of the most severe possible sentence would be arbitrary.
One cannot help from wondering if what really occurred here with such a harsh sentence for a first-time offender was a “trial tax.” This is a term that describes the handing down of the harshest possible sentence in order to punish the defendant for exercising his right to a jury trial, as opposed to pleading guilty and permitting the court and prosecution to dispose of a case without having to do the hard work associated with conducting a trial.