Permits to Carry and Sensitive Places (Part 8)

Like Plaintiff Gaudio, Plaintiff Muller is unable to protect himself while in a car and is concerned that loading and unloading a gun when getting into and out of a car as the legislation requires would cause “someone who saw him loading or unloading his gun to call the police.” In response, Defendants first argue that there is no need for urgency, and, at a minimum, this Court should afford Defendants more time to set forth the legal justifications for the newly enacted legislation. [State’s Br. at 7 (“The State files this response to the TRO application only, and requests an opportunity to fully brief the PI motion.”).]

Next, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have failed to establish an Article III injury redressable by the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Because each Plaintiff has failed to establish a sufficiently imminent injury, Defendants argue, standing is lacking and the Court’s jurisdiction is defective.

Finally, as to the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendants argue that many of the provisions challenged by Plaintiffs fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment, and even if they are covered by the text of the Second Amendment the provisions are supported by a historical tradition of firearm regulation consistent with the dictate of Bruen.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. In the Third Circuit, the four requirements Plaintiffs must satisfy to obtain the emergent injunctive relief sought are familiar ones: (1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that they will be irreparably injured if relief is not granted. In addition, the district court, in considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.

The fact that the temporary restraining order was granted in this case indicates that the order will eventually be permanent. Factors one and two above not only indicate that there is a reasonable probability of a final order, but also that the law at issue causes irreparable injury.