On May 5, 2026, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Camden County case of G.G.S. v. A.C.B. The principal issue under N.J.S.A.2C:25-29 concerned whether the sexual assault at issue warranted a Final Restraining Order when there was non history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant.
Judge Susswein wrote for the Court in relevant part: This appeal raises important questions under the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, when the predicate act of domestic violence involves egregious physical force–in this instance, an acquaintance rape involving manual strangulation. We address, for example, the tension that can arise between two important principles that inform the decision on whether to issue a final restraining order (FRO) under the PDVA: first, that the trial court must consider whether the predicate act was part of a pattern of historical domestic violence involving the parties; and second, that the need for an FRO is often “perfunctory and self-evident” when the predicate act involves physical violence, especially when the unlawful force is severe.
The trial court credited plaintiff’s testimony, finding there was a dating relationship, that defendant committed the predicate act of sexual assault, and that he placed his hands on plaintiff’s neck four or five times, affecting her breathing. The court described the violent episode as “despicable.” It also noted that defendant had “predatory tendencies” and found plaintiff’s testimony credible, stating, “I think she’s scared, I think she’s legitimate.”
The court nonetheless concluded that plaintiff had not established the grounds for an FRO, holding that plaintiff had not demonstrated that an FRO was necessary to protect her from “immediate danger.” In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the lack of a previous history of domestic violence between the parties. The court also commented, “I think that [defendant] understands that that’s not the kind of conduct of how a man should treat a woman.”
In this instance, we accord greater significance to the egregiousness of the physical force inflicted upon the victim than to the fact that there was no history of past acts of domestic violence between the parties. The forcible date rape, in other words, was sufficiently egregious to warrant an FRO notwithstanding that it was the first and only act of domestic violence defendant perpetrated against the victim. We add that the sexual violence committed in this case constitutes an archetypical example of the degree of coercive control and domination that triggers the PDVA’s protections. We likewise consider strangulation to be an act of control and domination that by itself will often justify the entry of an FRO even when it does not result in serious or significant bodily injury.
In this instance, once the trial court made its credibility findings, credited plaintiff’s testimony, found that defendant committed forcible acquaintance rape and strangled the victim, and acknowledged the parties might run into each other at school, the decision on whether to issue an FRO became perfunctory and the need for the protection of an FRO self-evident. We therefore reverse and remand for the court to enter an FRO. We do not retain jurisdiction.
We conclude by emphasizing that in describing the disturbing facts in this case, we do not mean to imply that physical violence less severe than the harm inflicted on plaintiff would not be “sufficiently egregious” to invoke the perfunctory-and-self-evident principle. The key point is that whenever the predicate act involves physical violence, the type and degree of that violence is a variable that must be accounted for under the second prong of the Silver test.
It is difficult to imagine why the trial court denied the FRO. It seems unlikely that he was concerned with the defendant prevailing on appeal. The defendant neither hired an appellate attorney nor did he file his own pro se brief to contest the plaintiff’s appeal.