In Lewis, the issue was whether the convictions for arson and aggravated assault should have merged with the conviction for aggravated manslaughter. As in this case, Lewis set one fire in an apartment building, although in that case, the fire also caused the death of one victim and serious injuries to several others. We rejected Lewis’s merger argument, reasoning that the legislature designated fire setting separately from other forms of assaultive conduct, with a “specific intent to fractionalize the offense.” The arson was complete as soon as the fire was “started.
Lewis also reasoned that the legislative history of the arson statute indicated that the Legislature addressed the issue of arson’s consequences by grading it as a more serious crime if it caused danger to persons: The Criminal Law Revision Commissioners originally recommended that the arson statute not grade the offense according to its danger to persons because “to make any dangerous burning a crime of the second degree would be inconsistent with Sections 2C:12-1” relating to assault. The legislature’s refusal to adopt this recommendation is indicative of its intent to punish arson separately based upon the risk that fire presents.
Our courts routinely defer to the Legislature’s decisions out of “separation of power” concerns. That is because it is the Legislature’s job to make laws, the Judiciary’s (courts) job to interpret the laws, and the Executive’s (law enforcement) job to enforce the laws. None of the three branches of government is supposed to infringe upon the power of another branch.