Defendant claims the anti-stalking statute is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied to him. When an overbreadth challenge is rejected, “the court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” However, a party “who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Ibid. (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95). Thus, it is defendant’s conduct that must be analyzed not “hypothetical applications of the law.” Ibid. (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95). Because we conclude the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, we have no need to address whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face.
The Court’s refusal to consider “hypothetical applications of the law” is consistent with the efficient administration of justice. They are busy enough deciding actual cases. The refusal is also consistent with precedent requiring courts to only reach constitutional issues if it is necessary to do so.