The legislative policies of various States in defining intellectual disability are also central to the inquiry. Hall, 572 U. S., at 710. By my count, here, as in Hall, “in 41 States an individual in Coonce’s position . . . would not be deemed automatically eligible for the death penalty.” Id., at 716.3 Two States impose no age-of-onset requirement in the Atkins context. Neb. Rev. Stat. §28–105.01(3) (Cum. Supp. 2014); Kan. Stat. §§21– 6622(h), 76–12b01(d) (Cum. Supp. 2018); see State v. Vela, 279 Neb. 94, 151, 777 N. W. 2d 266, 307 (2010) (discussing Nebraska Legislature’s choice to omit age-of-onset requirement). Two impose an age-22 onset requirement. See Ind. Code §35–36–9–2 (2021); Utah Code §77–15a– 102(2) (2021). A fifth State, the Nation’s most populous, recently amended its law to replace its rigid age-18 onset requirement with “the developmental period, as defined by clinical standards.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1376(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2021). A sixth dropped its rigid age18 onset requirement in 2014. Compare La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.5.1(H) (West 2014) (requiring onset “before the age of eighteen years”) with La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.5.1(H) (West Cum. Supp. 2021) (requiring onset “during the developmental period”).
State Supreme Courts often look to United States Supreme Court precedent. This case presents the less common scenario in which the United States Supreme Court looks to state supreme courts for guidance.