N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) permits tolling when identification is achieved directly by DNA evidence rather than DNA evidence in addition to other means. Accordingly, it is apparent that the Legislature intended the DNA-tolling provision to apply to the sole actor whom the DNA distinctly identifies.
Although we need not resort to extrinsic sources to ascertain the Legislature’s intent here, the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) leads us to the same conclusion. In 2002, the Senate and General Assembly amended N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 to include the DNA exception. L. 2001, c. 308, § 1(c) (effective Jan. 3, 2002). During its drafting phase, the initial bill used the phrases “the person who commits a crime” and “the person who committed the crime” instead of “the actor.” S. 1516/A. 2658 (2000). The Sponsors’ Statement accompanying that draft stated: “this bill would remove the time limitations on the prosecution of crimes when the person who committed the crime is unknown at the time, but DNA evidence collected at the crime scene can be used to identify the person at a later date.” Sponsors’ Statement to S. 1516 (Sept. 14, 2000); Sponsors’ Statement to A. 2658 (June 29, 2000). The Legislature noted the purpose behind the criminal statutes of limitations is “to protect defendants from the use of ‘stale’ evidence against them,” but pointedly distinguished “properly collected, handled and stored” DNA evidence because it “can reliably identify defendants many years after a crime has been committed.”
The Court notes that there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence but does so anyway. This was probably a means to make a complete record in support of their decision in case the prosecution chose to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.