We share the Bonano Court’s concern that the term “curtilage” is not well-defined. Grafting the amorphous and potentially complex curtilage concept into the definition of the term dwelling for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i), therefore, might introduce uncertainty and ambiguity to the penal code. For example, if we accepted the broad interpretation of dwelling that defendant proposes, would the exception to the general duty to retreat apply to the entire length of a driveway, extending to the apron that abuts a public sidewalk or street? Would it extend to the entire area of a back or side yard, reaching to and terminating at the unmarked boundary of a neighbor’s yard? Or is there an invisible line on a driveway or backyard–fixed somewhere between the point closest to the house and the outer boundaries of the property line–where the circumstances in which deadly force is authorized abruptly changes? We leave that type of line-drawing to the Legislature and decline to interpret this use-of-force provision of the penal code in a way that might render it impermissibly vague.
A counter-argument is that the term “curtilage” has been defined and applied for decades in the search and seizure context. With thousands of cases to draw from, we should be able to find a workable definition.