The prosecution would likely cite to the above-quoted language that “requires courts to order defendants to compensate their victims to the fullest extent possible given their ability to pay.” The counter-argument is that this is just a general statement that does not specifically endorse civil consent judgments against criminal defendants.
The State contends civil consent judgments are authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d), which provides that Chapter 43 of the Code – Authorized Disposition of Offenders – “does not deprive the court of any authority conferred by law to decree a forfeiture of property, suspend or cancel a license, remove a person from office, or impose any other civil penalty. Such a judgment or order may be included in the sentence.” It argues the judgment is a civil penalty which a court may order and enter.
The State’s argument does not consider the qualifying language in the statute that the authority to impose a civil penalty must be conferred by law. As we have deduced, civil consent judgments are not among the penalties conferred by law. We construe N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) to mean that the court may impose those civil penalties specified in a statute. The civil penalties include: suspension or cancellation of driving privileges as provided for in several statutes. Likewise, removal from office is a civil penalty expressly authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2.
The two cases relied upon by the State in support of its argument are inapposite. Both involved forfeiture of public office, a penalty expressly authorized by statute as a collateral consequence of conviction.