Therefore, for constitutional reasons, the Court will construe the terms “any other course of alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy” as repeated communications directed at a person that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or security or that intolerably interfere with that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. […]
Harassment and the First Amendment: Part 4
Outside of the category of obscenity, courts should not play the role of censor by engaging in a weighing of an expression’s value or relative social costs and benefits. Speech cannot be criminalized merely because others see no value in it. Nonetheless, neither the First Amendment nor Article I, Paragraph 6 of our State Constitution […]
Harassment and the First Amendment: Part 3
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 distinguishes between “communications” and “language” that violate the statute in subsection (a), and “conduct” and “acts” that do so in subsection (c). Although a “course of alarming conduct” or “repeatedly committed acts” can occur through communications and language alone, it is far from clear that the Legislature had in mind offensive speech as […]
Harassment and the First Amendment: Part 2
The municipal court entered a guilty verdict against Burkert for harassing Halton on January 8 and 11 in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). The court found that Burkert made and circulated the flyers in the garage and locker room, that the bubble dialogue inscribed on the Haltons’ wedding photograph was “lewd and obnoxious,” and that such […]
Harassment and the First Amendment: Part 1
On December 19, 2017, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of State v. William Burkert. The principle issue was whether the harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), violated the first amendment. Justice Albin wrote for the six-justice majority. This case tests the limits to which a broadly worded harassment statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), can criminalize speech. […]
Warrants and Specificity of Locations: Part 4
In State v. Keyes, the Court held that a confidential informant’s tip could serve as the basis for issuing a warrant if there is “substantial evidence in the record to support the informant’s statements.” Although police could not observe the informant enter the home in that case, under the totality of the circumstances, there was […]
Warrants and Specificity of Locations: Part 3
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that because the warrant affidavit failed to provide specific information as to why defendant’s apartment and not other units should be searched, the warrant application was deficient. The search-and-seizure provision in Article I, Paragraph 7 of New Jersey’s Constitution affords a higher level of protection for citizens than the […]
Warrants and Specificity of Locations: Part 2
The trial court subsequently issued a warrant to search Boone, his residence, and his car. Police executed the search warrant on September 7, 2012, and found between one-half and five ounces of cocaine and an illegal handgun in Unit 4A. They then arrested defendant. In February 2013, a grand jury charged Boone with seven […]
Warrants and Specificity of Locations : Part 1
On December 18, 2017, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of State v. Akeem Boone. Justice Fernandez-Vina wrote for a unanimous Court. The principle issue was whether a warrant application that did not include evidence as to why a specific apartment unit should be searched fell short of establishing probable cause for the […]
Criminal Sentencing and Civil Consent Judgements: Part 3
When the Legislature provided a statutory procedure to recover payment of fines, we declined to construe N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(d) as conferring authority on a court to impose fines as a “civil penalty”, defendant was both convicted of and pleaded guilty to crimes related to false claims and appraisals he submitted to defraud an insurance company. The […]
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