Criminal Law Blog

Judge Puglisi continued in relevant part: "SORNA classifies sex offenders into three risk tiers--Tiers I, II, and III--for registration and notification purposes, depending solely on the nature of the offense." Id. at 62 (citing 34 U.S.C. § 20911). "The offender's...

The Appellate Division continued in relevant part: J.R. relies heavily on his assertion that, regardless of his residency in another state, he nevertheless continues to have Megan's Law "status" in New Jersey. We reject this argument because there is no legal "status"...

On January 31, 2024, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Middlesex County case of IN the Matter of Registrant J.R. The principal issue before the Court under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 concerned whether the resident of another state had standing to seek termination of his...

The unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court concluded with the following in relevant part: Defendant urges us to dismiss the witness tampering charge with prejudice because "the evidence is insufficient" to allow a reasonable jury to conclude "that Hill knew that it was...

Justice Wainer Apter continued in relevant part: Defendant's letter is not integral to the criminal act of tampering with a witness on its face. It does not explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely, withhold testimony, elude legal process, absent herself from any...

The New Jersey Supreme Court continued in relevant part: It is therefore unsurprising that during deliberations, the jury requested a typed copy of the letter to review and then, as an alternative, heard a readback of the letter being read out loud by a detective....

On January 18, 2024, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the Hudson County case of State v. William Hill. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5 concerned the constitutionality of the witness tampering statute. Justice Wainer Apter wrote for the unanimous Court...

The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded with the following in relevant part: But we have previously held that for a prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b), which requires that a threat be made "under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy...

The Court continued in relevant part: We also disagree with defendant that Watts would have been decided differently under the recklessness standard we adopt today. Watts did not turn on the defendant's subjective mens rea. It turned on the objective component of a...

Justice Wainer Apter continued in relevant part: The State did not assert that defendant was guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 because he told the police they were "causing too much chaos over here for nothing"; because he called Officer Healey "the f---ing devil";...