On August 17, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the Mercer County case of State v. Jamar Myers. The principal issue concerned whether the defendant was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea to felony murder.
Justice Wainer Apter wrote for the unanimous Court in relevant part: In July 2011, defendant, Peter Nyema, and Tyrone Miller were charged under Indictment 11-08-0833 with armed robbery and eleven other offenses related to the May 6, 2011 robbery of a 7-Eleven. Following the robbery, the police stopped and searched the car Miller was driving; defendant and Nyema were passengers. The officers seized dark clothing, a handgun, and nearly $600 in cash. Defendant moved to suppress that evidence; the motion court denied suppression except as to what was found under the hood and in the trunk of the car, which included the handgun.
In February 2014, defendant was charged under Superseding Indictment 14 02-0232 with murder, felony murder, and other charges related to the April 29, 2011 attempted robbery at Vizzoni’s Pharmacy and homicide at Brunswick Avenue Pharmacy (the Pharmacies case). The State moved under N.J.R.E. 404(b) to introduce as evidence in the Pharmacies case surveillance footage from the 7-Eleven and the clothing and money seized after the robbery. The judge granted that motion.
On the morning of jury selection in the Pharmacies case, the judge discussed the State’s final plea offer with defendant, defense counsel, and the State. The judge stated that, “even with a guilty plea, that doesn’t prevent you from filing an appeal and if an appellate court judge finds that I committed an error, that I was wrong in my 404(b) decisions or anything else, your guilty plea could be reversed.” The parties presented a single signed plea agreement, in which defendant agreed to plead guilty to felony murder (from the Pharmacies case indictment); armed robbery (from the 7-Eleven indictment), and three violations of probation. Under Question 4(e) of the signed plea agreement, “Do you further understand that by pleading guilty you are waiving your right to appeal the denial of all other pretrial motions except the following,” the parties circled “Yes” and handwrote: “404 B decision in 14-02-232; motion to suppress physical evidence in 11-08-833.” Defense counsel highlighted that defendant was “reserving his right to appeal the 404(b) decision in the homicide case and the motion to suppress physical evidence in the armed robbery case.”
Defense counsel was not required to highlight that the defendant reserved his right to appeal the motion to suppress physical evidence. In New Jersey state courts, there is an automatic right to appeal motions to suppress physical evidence. The same is true for decisions regarding pre-trial intervention (P.T.I.) decisions. The right to reserve all other final criminal decisions must be negotiated. Alternatively, the defense has a right to appeal other final criminal decisions after a conviction at trial. There is logically nothing for the defense to appeal if the defendant is acquitted at trial.
The Court continued in relevant part: Defendant appealed, seeking reversal of the adverse rulings on the motion to suppress in the 7-Eleven case and the 404(b) motion in the Pharmacies case. The Appellate Division affirmed, but a different appellate panel then reached the opposite conclusion in Nyema’s appeal, holding that the same motor vehicle stop was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion. The Court reversed the appellate panel in Myers and affirmed the panel in Nyema in a single decision, holding that there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the car. State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. at 516, 531 (2022).
The Court reversed the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the clothing and money, and vacated defendant’s armed robbery conviction. The State moved to dismiss Indictment 11-08-0833, the 7-Eleven case, stating there was “insufficient evidence upon which to predicate successful prosecution.” Defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea under indictment numbers “11 08-0833/14-02-0232.” The judge denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed.
Pursuant to Rules 3:5-7 and 3:9-3(f), and under the particular circumstances of this case, defendant must be permitted to withdraw his plea. That holding is specific to the facts of this case. The Court does not decide whether defendants who enter conditional pleas involving multiple indictments may always withdraw from the entire plea agreement after a successful appeal under only one indictment.
Plea agreements are governed by basic principles of contract law. Like other contracts, a plea agreement requires a meeting of the minds, and all material terms and relevant consequences must be clearly disclosed, fully understood, and knowingly and voluntarily accepted by the defendant. The New Jersey Court Rules govern guilty pleas and motions to suppress evidence. Pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(a), “a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure” may file a motion “to suppress the evidence.” If the motion to suppress is denied, the defendant is entitled to appeal even if he first pleads guilty.
Under Rule 3:9-3(f), also known as the conditional plea rule, a defendant may explicitly reserve the right to appeal the “adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.” If the defendant then “prevails on appeal, the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his or her plea.” R. 3:9-3(f) (emphasis added). State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009), set forth principles to assess plea withdrawal motions. The Court notes that, even after Slater, courts have permitted withdrawal pursuant to the conditional plea rule without reference to Slater.
Here, defendant’s motion to withdraw is governed by Rules 3:5-7(d) and 3:9-3(f), not by Slater. Although he was not required to preserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress because it was preserved automatically by Rule 3:5 7(d), defendant nonetheless specifically preserved, “with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, on the record,” R. 3:9-3(f), his “right to appeal the denial” of the “404 B decision in Indictment 14-02-232 and motion to suppress physical evidence in Indictment 11-08-833.” Defendant then “prevailed on appeal” on the motion to suppress the physical evidence in Indictment 11-08-833. See R. 3:9-3(f); Nyema, 249 N.J. at 516, 535. Because defendant “prevailed on the appeal” of that motion, he “shall be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea.” R. 3:9-3(f).
Under the particular facts of this case, “the opportunity to withdraw his plea” must mean allowing defendant to withdraw his felony murder plea in the Pharmacies case. First, in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing, the parties and the court repeatedly referred to defendant’s right to withdraw his one singular “plea,” not two separate “pleas.” Second, at the time of defendant’s plea, the clothing and money seized after the 7-Eleven robbery were admitted as 404(b) evidence in the Pharmacies case. However, the clothing and money have now been suppressed, and the State does not argue that they can still be introduced against defendant in the Pharmacies case. And because the money and clothes were suppressed, the State now has less incriminating evidence to introduce against defendant in the Pharmacies case, and the bargaining positions of the parties as to those charges have been altered. In the specific circumstances of this case, therefore, defendant must be permitted to withdraw his felony murder guilty plea. The Court does not reach defendant’s argument that under the conditional plea rule, a defendant is automatically entitled to withdraw from all guilty pleas entered as part of a global plea agreement any time he wins an appeal of any pre-plea motion.
This argument seems to be supported by the Court’s requiring plea withdrawal when “the bargaining positions of the parties as to those charges have been altered.” It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a resolution of several cases is reached, the evidence supporting one of the guilty pleas is suppressed, and the bargaining positions are not altered. The bargaining positions might not be “significantly” altered if there is other strong evidence to support the charge.
Justice Wainer Apter concluded in relevant part: the Court refers to both the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice and the Acting Administrative Director of the New Jersey Courts the question of whether to change plea forms in any way. The Court further encourages plea judges to clarify on the record the parties’ intentions regarding conditional guilty pleas in cases with multiple separate indictments.
