On July 30, 2025, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Cape May County case of In the Matter of the Expungement of the Criminal/Juvenile Records of P.L. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 concerned whether a Recovery Court graduate could have a juvenile adjudication expunged when the adjudication cannot be expunged under the general expungement statute.
Judge Jablonski wrote for the panel in relevant part: N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14 contains seven references to juvenile delinquency “adjudications.” We presume the Legislature understood this term and could have included it in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m)(2) if it wished to exempt certain types of juvenile adjudications from Recovery Court expungement. See Savage v. Twp. of Neptune (2024) (declining to read into a statute a particular term the Legislature could have included but chose not to include in the statute).
It is well-settled juvenile adjudications are not considered criminal convictions. State v. Cummings (App. Div. 1999); State in the Int. of K.P. (App. Div. 1979). Additionally, although the general expungement statute treats juvenile delinquency adjudications as equivalent to adult offenses for the purpose of expungement eligibility, the relief available under the Recovery Court statute provides for a different outcome.
Because P.L.’s application was submitted under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m) after his successful completion of the Recovery Court program, his eligibility is governed by the requirements outlined in that statute. The plain language of that statute does not include any bar against expungement of juvenile adjudications. To accept the positions advanced by the State and Attorney General would effectively require inserting “juvenile adjudications” into N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m)(2), contrary to the established rules of statutory interpretation.
Inserting language that does not exist into a statute that does not include it “far exceeds the judiciary’s role in such matters.” Simadiris v. Paterson Pub. Sch. Dist. (App. Div. 2021). Doing so “would be legislating, not interpreting. In the final analysis, we cannot presume the Legislature ‘intended a result different from what is indicated by the plain language or add a qualification to a statute that the Legislature chose to omit.'”
In sum, we must “apply the law as written.” Shelton v. Restaurant.com (2013). Some restrictions included by the Legislature in the general expungement statute were not included by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m) and, thus, do not apply when a Recovery Court petitioner seeks expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m). Therefore, a successful Recovery Court graduate, who has a juvenile adjudication that may be non-expungable under the general expungement statute, may have an entire record expunged because the operative Recovery Court statute does not bar the expungement of juvenile adjudications.
This case will likely be appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court. The prosecution will almost certainly rely in part on the language in the Recovery Court expungement statute that says: “The court shall grant the relief requested unless it finds that the need for the availability of the records outweighs the desirability of having the person freed from any disabilities associated with their availability, or it finds that the person is otherwise ineligible for expungement pursuant to paragraph (2) of this subsection.”
