Restraining Orders and Statutory Immunity (Part 4)

by | Oct 7, 2023 | Blog, Criminal Law, Monmouth County, New Jersey, Ocean County

The Court concluded with the following in relevant part: With regard to the best interests of the victim and any child, the court notes that that minor child herein is not W.M-H.’s child. The court also highlights the short nature of the parties’ relationship. The court also notes that the parties’ relationship ended months before E.W. sought a restraining order and that she only sought that restraining order after pursuing remedies in both the civil and criminal realms. But for the ongoing issue of the monies provided to W.M-H. by E.W., there would be no contact between the parties. Any future contact will likely be confined to various court appearances in efforts to resolve that concurrent litigation. In looking to the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court is constrained to find that this factor does not support the entry of a final restraining order.

The court need not address any evidence as to determining custody and parenting time and the protection of the victim’s safety, given the factual underpinnings of this case. Suffice to say that the court is convinced that W.M-H. is not as he allegedly presented himself to E.W., to wit as a government assassin, in the beginning of their courtship. Again, the court cannot find that this factor favors the entry of a final restraining order.

Finally, there is no evidence as to the existence of a verifiable order of protection from any another jurisdiction. This likewise does not favor the entry of a final restraining order.

Given these findings, the court finds that E.W. has not met her burden of proof as to a continuing need for a restraining order. E.W. has failed to satisfy the second prong of Silver, and the court shall dismiss the application for a final restraining order.

For the foregoing reasons, authority cited, having reviewed the filings, considered the evidence in this record, and based upon the court’s findings and the predicate acts alleged, E.W. has proven by a preponderance of credible evidence that W.M-H. committed the predicate act of harassment. While E.W. has satisfied the first prong of Silver, the court finds that E.W. has failed to satisfy the second prong. Therefore, the court finds that a final restraining order is not necessary to protect E.W. from an immediate danger and to prevent further abuse.

E.W.’s application for a final restraining order is hereby denied. The complaint is dismissed, and the temporary restraining order is dissolved.

Without the second prong of Silver, a remote act of harassment could be a basis for a restraining order. That would be unjust given the significant effects that a restraining order can have.