On December 1, 2025, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Middlesex County case of A.C. v. R.S. The principal issues under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-16 concerned whether cyber-harassment could be based on text messages and whether the circumstances of the case supported liability for “lewdness.”
Presiding Judge Mawla wrote for the panel in relevant part: Defendant R.S. appeals from a November 22, 2024 final protective order (FPO) entered against her and in favor of plaintiff A.C., pursuant to the Victim’s Assistance and Survivor Protection Act (VASPA), N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 to -21. We reverse for the reasons expressed in this opinion.
We reject defendant’s assertion a text message cannot be considered an online communication under VASPA. At the outset, we reiterate the Legislature clearly intended VASPA to include individuals who are victims of the offenses enumerated in the statute but could not be protected by the PDVA. VASPA was intended to fill the void” left by the PDVA. In C.R., the Court observed “as a complement to the PDVA, VASPA mirrors the PDVA in certain respects, and diverges from it in others.” The Court then detailed the many similarities and some differences between the statutes, which we need not repeat here.
For purposes of our discussion, we have stated the Legislature intended the PDVA to “assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.” Given the complementary relationship between the PDVA and VASPA, we interpret VASPA like the PDVA to provide maximum protection to victims. To that end, we construe the online element of cyber-harassment under VASPA to include text messages.
This oft-repeated line is problematic for defendants facing restraining orders. It encourages judges to err on their side on any close issue or in any close case. In this case, the panel ruled against the self-represented plaintiff. The appellant-defendant had the benefit of appellate counsel.
Text messages can be transmitted in three forms, namely, SMS, MMS (multimedia messaging service), and RCS (rich communications service). A device is “online” if it is “connected to the Internet or other network.” Although an SMS text typically uses a traditional cellular network rather than the internet, an SMS text can be transmitted online. Google Messages for web sends SMS messages using a connection from your computer to your phone. For these reasons, we are satisfied defendant made an online communication. To conclude otherwise we would ignore the dual modality of SMS messaging, including messaging applications, and we would carve out a popular form of messaging from the ambit of VASPA, which we do not believe the Legislature intended.
This is an example of a Court siding with a plaintiff on an issue in a close case. It is difficult to imagine that someone with no access to internet service could commit cyber-harassment. The Court here held otherwise. On the other hand, the Legislature is limited in the number of words that it can use to title a statute. With that in mind, “cyber-harassment” could foreseeably include text messages since they can be every bit as harassing as an email.
We are also convinced defendant’s statement, she would go to the ECDOC and plaintiff’s new employer, targeted plaintiff’s property. Long ago, our Supreme Court said: “A calling, business or profession, chosen and followed, is property.” We have upheld the entry of a restraining order on harassment grounds under the PDVA where a defendant threatened to send lewd pictures of the plaintiff to her employer.
Our difficulty here is that defendant’s statement she would contact the ECDOC (Essex County Department of Corrections) and plaintiff’s employer did not qualify as cyber-harassment because it did not threaten to inflict any injury or harm, let alone threaten to commit a crime, affecting plaintiff’s job. We might be convinced defendant committed cyber-harassment if, as happened in McGowan, defendant threatened to communicate with the employers by providing them with false or illicit information injurious to plaintiff. That did not happen here. The record shows defendant intended to inform the employers about plaintiff’s relationship with her husband. This was neither a crime nor the sort of injury VASPA intended to prevent.
Finally, because we have concluded plaintiff did not establish a predicate act under VASPA, we need not reach defendant’s arguments regarding the judge’s findings related to the timing of the text communications. We also do not reach the argument concerning the lack of findings regarding the possibility of future risk to plaintiff’s safety.
