On February 10, 2026, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Camden County case of S.M.T. v. S.A. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29 concerned the adequacy of the trial court’s conclusions of fact and law in denying a final restraining order.
Judge Berdote Byrne wrote for the Appellate Division in relevant part: The trial court failed to make specific findings as to the allegations of non-consensual sex or whether a sexual assault had occurred. See Big Smoke LLC v. Twp. of W. Milford, (App. Div. 2024). A trial court’s failure to clearly state all conclusions of fact and law ‘constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court. The court’s statement: “I think ultimately her testimony was that she refused to engage in the acts depicted” is belied by the record. This was not S.M.T.’s testimony; she stated when she would say no, S.A. “would force it.”
Our law is clear; sexual assault may occur between two people who are married. See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-5(b) (“No actor shall be presumed to be incapable of committing sexual assault because of marriage to the victim.”); see also State v. Smith, (1981) (discussing “the inequities of a medieval rule that denies some women protection against sexual attack and treats them as sexual property of their husbands”). A domestic violence victim’s marital status is irrelevant as to whether the alleged victim consented to a sexual act. S.M.T., whom the court found credible, proved she was a victim of sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, S.M.T. met the first prong of Silver. Instead, the court stated: “It’s clear from the contentions that it’s somehow recognized by S.M.T. that S.A. feels he has a right to exert certain authority over her, and again, the court doesn’t pretend to understand the actual tenets of the faith or culture in that regard.” Tenets of faith and culture are not relevant as to whether acts of physical or sexual assault occurred. And, because the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the predicate act of sexual assault, the court did not consider it when applying the second prong of Silver.
Appellate courts are required to give great deference to the credibility determinations of the trial courts. This is because only so much can be gleaned from the transcripts of a trial. Had the trial court held that it had the opportunity to observe S.M.T.’s demeanor and did not find her to be credible, it could have changed the result of this appeal.
The Appellate Division continued in relevant part: In determining whether an FRO should issue during the secondary analysis of Silver, “the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(1) to -29a(6) [now (7)], to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse.”
The secondary analysis of Silver requires an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (7): (1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim’s safety; (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction; and (7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person’s liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights with the court specifically considering evidence of the need for protection from immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse.
Effective January 8, 2024, the PDVA was amended to include coercive control among the statutory factors courts must consider when determining whether to issue an FRO. Coercive control is not among the predicate acts enumerated in the PDVA; rather, it is analyzed pursuant to the secondary analysis of Silver once a predicate act of domestic violence has been proven.
Some courts consider the above-referenced “guiding standard” to be an independent requirement for the issuance of a restraining order. Under that requirement, a “stale” act of domestic violence and/or stale factors weighing in favor of the plaintiff might not support the issuance of a final restraining order. This is because a restraining order that was once necessary can become unnecessary with the passage of time and a change of circumstances in which the immediate danger and risk of further abuse cease to exist.
The three-judge panel continued in relevant part: Our courts have long recognized controlling behavior as a dangerous form of domestic violence that threatens the safety of those subjected to it. See Cesare, (describing domestic violence “as a ‘pattern of abusive and controlling behavior injurious to its victims'” (emphasis added). In New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. I.H.C., we noted the testimony of an expert in domestic violence, who described coercive control as a: malevolent course of conduct directed toward a social partner in order to dominate that partner using strategies of physical abuse, isolation from support systems, intimidation involving threats, degradation involving emotional abuse, confinement, and can also include surveillance, and restrictions on the ability to move freely and act independently and make autonomous decisions.
The Legislature’s recent amendment of the PDVA to include coercive control of a secondary analysis factor in determining whether an FRO should issue reflects a renewed intent to prevent this type of domestic violence. The amendment provides coercive control may include, but shall not be limited to: (a) isolating the person from friends, relatives, transportation, medical care, or other source of support; (b) depriving the person of basic necessities; (c) monitoring the person’s movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services; (d) compelling the person by force, threat, or intimidation, including, but not limited to, threats based on actual or suspected immigration status; (e) threatening to make or making baseless reports to the police, courts, the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) within the Department of Children and Families, the Board of Social Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), or other parties; (f) threatening to harm or kill the individual’s relative or pet; (g) threatening to deny or interfere with an individual’s custody or parenting time, other than through enforcement of a valid custody arrangement or court order pursuant to current law including, but not limited to, an order issued pursuant to Title 9 of the Revised Statutes; or (h) any other factors or circumstances that the court deems relevant or material. If the court finds that one or more factors of coercive control are more or less relevant than others, the court shall make specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law on the reasons why the court reached that conclusion. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7).
The trial court failed to make findings regarding the allegations of coercive control in its analysis of prong two. S.M.T. detailed S.A.’s acts of coercive control in limiting her travel, controlling the family’s finances and her access to money, surveillance by various electronic means, and depriving her of sleep using lights, television noise, and spilling water on her. This testimony supports a finding that S.A.’s acts of coercive control required issuance of an FRO.
The natural result of the statute’s new “written findings” requirement is that courts will be motivated to state that they “do not find any one factor of coercive control to be more relevant than any other. The court finds them all to be equally relevant.” That will save trial courts valuable time in the realm FRO trials which are numerous and time-consuming. The “written findings” requirement might also be seen as “busy work” from our Legislature since there are electronic recordings and the availability of written transcripts with all restraining order trials.