The Appellate Division concluded with the following in relevant part: While we conclude the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) authorizes defendant’s custodial sentences as a condition of his probation, we also observe a probationary sentence conditioned on service of the mandatory period of parole ineligibility is consistent with the Legislature’s “criminalization of the act of driving while one’s […]

Judge Vernoia continued in relevant part: More pertinent here, the Court also directed that, where the trial court concludes a probationary sentence is appropriate, “it must condition that term on a 270-day period of community service or of incarceration without parole eligibility.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court permitted and approved a split sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(2) that includes imprisonment and […]

The Appellate Division continued in relevant part: Here, the periods of parole ineligibility imposed as conditions of defendant’s imprisonment do not fall within the Hartye proscription. The trial court did not sentence defendant to a term of imprisonment at a state correctional facility in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(3) or impose a period of parole ineligibility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b). Instead, the court […]

The Court recognized that both subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2 provide for imposition of terms of “imprisonment,” and it noted differences between the imprisonment authorized in each subsection. For example, the Court explained that a term of imprisonment under subsection (b)(3) “must be served in a state correctional facility,” whereas the custodial portion of a split […]

The Appellate panel continued in relevant part: In Rodriguez, the Court reasoned that an intermittent sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b)(7) is not authorized for a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 because N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c) “otherwise provides” for service of a mandatory period of parole ineligibility. Here, unlike in Rodriguez, there is no Criminal Code provision that “otherwise provides” for a sentence that is inconsistent with imposition of a split […]

Judge Vernoia continued in relevant part: The enumerated sentencing alternatives listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(b) must be applied “except as provided in subsection (a),” and subsection (a) includes a more general exception. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(a) requires sentencing in accordance with the seven enumerated sentencing alternatives, “except as otherwise provided by” the Criminal Code. In other words, the enumerated sentencing alternatives are authorized and […]

On June 4, 2020, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Sussex County case of State v. Andres Chavarria. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2 concerned the legality of sentencing a defendant to county jail time with mandatory parole ineligibility as a condition of probation following fourth-degree driving with suspended license convictions.                                   Former Monmouth County criminal […]

The appellate panel concluded with the following: As best as we can tell from the limited record here, the only “transaction” committed by Marias was his sale of a portion of the stolen goods. Had he been charged under subsection (a) with illegally possessing the remainder of the stolen goods in his grandmother’s garage, the […]

On May 19, 2020, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Essex County case of State v. Ian Marias. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-23 was whether the “fair market value” underlying a money laundering charge is capped by the discounted price that the defendant received for stolen goods. Presiding Judge Sabatino wrote for the Appellate […]