The Supreme Court majority concluded with the following in relevant part: The Government’s interpretation of the statute would create traps for unwary state and local officials. Sun-Diamond, 526 U. S., at 411. The Government says that the statute would not cover “innocuous” or “obviously benign” gratuities, but the Government does not identify any remotely clear lines separating such a gratuity from a criminal gratuity. The Government simply opines that state and local officials may not accept wrongful gratuities.
The Government’s so-called guidance would leave state and local officials entirely at sea to guess about what gifts they are allowed to accept under federal law, with the threat of up to 10 years in federal prison if they happen to guess wrong. That is not how federal criminal law works. And the Court has rejected the view that it should construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will use it responsibly. See McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 576.
Faced with the phalanx of difficulties with its interpretation of §666, the Government’s argument boils down to one main point—that §666 uses the term “rewarded” as well as “influenced.” The Government says that Congress would not have added the term “rewarded” to “influenced” in §666 if the statute were meant to cover only bribes and not also gratuities. That argument is misconceived. Contrary to the premise of the Government’s argument, bribery statutes sometimes use the term “reward.” See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §600; 33 U. S. C. §447. Moreover, without the term “rewarded” in §666, an official might try to defend against a bribery charge by saying that the payment was received only after the official act and therefore could not have “influenced” the act. By including the term “rewarded,” Congress made clear that the timing of the agreement is the key, not the timing of payment. Although a gratuity or reward offered and accepted by a state or local official after the official act may be unethical or illegal under other federal, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate §666.
Justice Jackson, was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan in dissent. She wrote that the majority’s “absurd and atextual reading of the statute is one only today’s Court could love.” The dissent was comprised of the justices widely considered to be part of the most “liberal” wing of the Court. The defendant, James Snyder, is a conservative republican who majored in theology.
