The next important case to address Confrontation Clause issues was the 2007 New Jersey Appellate Division case of State v. Renshaw. There, a three-judge panel wrote in relevant part: Defendant Robert Renshaw appeals from a conviction for driving while intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
After being found guilty in the municipal court of Franklin Township, defendant appealed to the Law Division, where a trial de novo again resulted in his conviction. Except for vacating the thirty-day county jail sentence that had been imposed in the municipal court for driving while intoxicated, the sentence in the Law Division was identical to the sentence imposed in Franklin Township. Appropriate fines and penalties were also assessed. All of defendant’s penalties, except for the license suspension, have been stayed pending appeal.
On appeal, defendant argues:
I. THE BLOOD RESULTS WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ODOR OF ALCOHOL AND THE HAPPENING OF AN ACCIDENT, WITHOUT MORE, DO NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEIZE BLOOD WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II. A BLOOD SAMPLE WAS TAKEN FROM RENSHAW WITHOUT CONSENT AND AGAINST HIS WILL: FAILURE TO OBTAIN A WARRANT TO OBTAIN THE BLOOD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES MUST CAUSE SUPPRESSION OF THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS.
III. ADMISSION OF THE “UNIFORM CERTIFICATION FOR BODILY SPECIMENS TAKEN IN A MEDICALLY ACCEPTABLE MANNER” VIOLATED APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AS DEFINED BY CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE STATE TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE THE BLOOD ALCOHOL RESULTS WITHOUT PROVIDING A PROPER FOUNDATION TO SHOW HOW THE HEAD SPACE GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY INSTRUMENT ARRIVED AT ITS RESULTS.
V. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE TESTED BLOOD SAMPLE WAS NOT CONTAMINATED AND THAT THE BLOOD ALCOHOL RESULT WAS RELIABLE.
VI. WITHOUT THE ADMISSION OF THE BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION RESULTS, THE STATE HAS FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. RENSHAW WAS INTOXICATED.
These six points raised before the municipal court and Law Division give the impression that the 30-day jail sentence imposed was a “trial tax.” That means that it was only imposed because the defendant exercised his right to a trial and it would not have been imposed had he pleaded guilty to the DWI. Courts will sometimes punish a defendant at sentencing for mounting a vigorous defense that made additional work for the Court. This was likely recognized by the Lw Division when it vacated the jail sentence after the municipal appeal was denied.
