Drug Offenses and the Armed Career Criminal Act (Part 5)

by | Sep 14, 2024 | Blog, Criminal Law, Monmouth County, New Jersey, Ocean County

The 6-3 United States Supreme Court majority concluded with the following in relevant part: Brown also claims that his reading is required by United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110, which says that when the law changes while a case is in progress, the case must be decided under the new law. But §924(e)(2)(A)(ii) has not changed at any point in the litigation.

Petitioners’ additional arguments do not persuade. Petitioners assert that this Court’s interpretation is underinclusive because it would preclude ACCA enhancements for state offenses involving drugs added to the federal lists only after the state crimes were committed. But none of the parties’ interpretations captures all cases involving career criminals. Petitioners next suggest that the Government’s interpretation is absurd because it would exclude all state drug convictions before the CSA’s enactment in 1970. But there are reasons Congress might have chosen not to court either federal or state drug convictions that occurred before 1970.

Petitioners also argue that the Government’s interpretation would unduly burden courts and defendants by requiring them to undertake the laborious task of digging up old federal drug schedules and comparing those to the state laws the defendants violated, but petitioners overstate the difficulty of this task. Finally, petitioners contend that the rule of lenity counsels in favor of their interpretations. But lenity applies only if a statute remains grievously ambiguous, and here context, precedent, and statutory design adequately show “what Congress intended.” United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157, 173.

Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett. Justice Jackson filed a dissent in which she was joined by Justices Kagan, and Gorsuch.

The majority’s analysis weakens and becomes non-existent towards the end of the opinion. Statements like “there are reasons Congress might have chosen not to court either federal or state drug convictions that occurred before 1970” call for speculation and provide no guidance.