On March 18, 2026, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Bergen County case of IMO the Appeal of the Denial od Mikhail Polatov’s Application for a Firearms Purchaser ID Card. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 concerned the propriety of the denial of the firearms purchaser card based on the applicant’s conflicting testimony regarding their prior offense.
Chief Judge Sumners wrote for the Appellate Division in relevant part: In this case of first impression, we must interpret recent amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5). The statute previously prohibited the issuance of a permit to purchase a handgun (PPH) and a firearms purchaser identification card (FPIC) “to any person where the issuance would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare.”
We conclude the court erred in its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) to deny Polatov’s application due to the conflicting testimony he gave concerning the pretrial disposition of his 2011 New York shoplifting charge. The determinative factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) “focuses on whether the applicant, armed with a firearm, poses a danger to the public.” Koons, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 563. Polatov’s contradictory testimony about whether he pled guilty in 2011 to an offense, does not support the court’s finding that he lacks the essential character of temperament necessary to be entrusted with a firearm because he would be a public danger. There is no evidence that Polatov exhibited behavior–criminal conduct, aggressive behavior, threats of violence, emotional instability, alcoholism, substance abuse, or mental health concerns–that establishes he could not be entrusted with a firearm. Likewise, there is no indication in the record that Polatov’s lack of credibility correlated to the absence of the essential character of temperament that would make him more likely than not to be a danger to public health, safety, or welfare if he had a firearm.
This last sentence in the opinion could be a basis for the prosecution’s appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. The State could argue that if there is not a consequence to making incredible statements in a firearms application, it defeats the purpose of the application process. The previous sentence provides a great roadmap for prosecutors and defense attorneys to argue these cases based on the broad “danger to the public” catch-all in the related statute.
The three-judge panel continued in relevant part: Polatov’s argument that disqualification under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) requires sustained or repetitive conduct is without merit. While this court found that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) disqualified the applicant in M.U., in part, because of his repetitive misconduct, it does not necessarily follow that repetitive misconduct is a prerequisite to disqualification under that provision. In Matter of Sbitani (App. Div. 1987), we held the applicant should not be issued a FPIC because of a single disorderly persons offense that denied him a weapon under a different statute.
Finally, we decline to address Polatov’s constitutional challenges to N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5) as they are not “imperative to the disposition” of this matter. Randolph Town Ctr., L.P. v. Cnty. of Morris (2006). Generally, New Jersey courts will adjudicate the constitutionality of legislation only if a constitutional determination is absolutely necessary to resolve a controversy between parties.” Our conclusion that Polatov’s FPIC and PPH application should have been granted because there is no evidence he is disqualified under the statute, makes it unnecessary to determine his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional. The decision is reversed and the case is remanded for issuance of a FPIC and a PPH to Polatov.
