On February 23, 2026, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Hudson County case of State v. Norman Millner. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 concerned whether defendants have a right to challenge the State’s interpretation of an out-of-state sex offense before being charged with failing to register as a sex offender.
Judge Smith wrote for the Appellate Division in relevant part: In the companion case of State v. Gregg, the trial court determined that Gregg’s South Carolina obligation to register for his sex crimes in that state created an obligation, as a matter of law, to register in New Jersey. The trial court further concluded that the assistant prosecutor did not have to conduct a “similar to” analysis under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(3). We disagree. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(3) does not negate the State’s obligation to conduct the “similar to” analysis based on whether a defendant was required to register, or not, in another state. The trial court’s narrow reading of subsection (c)(3) disregards this step. The Legislature expressly required that the State determine that an out-of-state sex offender’s crimes are “similar to” a New Jersey Megan’s Law sex offense before that out-of-state offender can be charged with a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(c)(3). We conclude the trial court’s denial of Gregg’s motion to dismiss the indictment was error.
In Millner, the trial court found that the State did not conduct the statutory analysis, but, nevertheless, decided that Millner was required to register as a sex offender in New Jersey based solely on his previous obligation to register in New York. The trial court further found that the State’s failure to conduct the analysis was not intentional, did not “infringe upon the grand jury’s decision-making function,” and that “any alleged inaccuracies were not sufficient to justify dismissal of the warrant.” The court was persuaded by the State’s argument that had the “similar to” analysis been done, it would have determined that Millner was required to register in New Jersey for the sexual offense committed in New York.
For the reasons stated, we disagree with the trial court’s approach, the Legislature clearly imposed a duty upon the State in subsection (b)(3) to perform the “similar to” analysis. The trial court improperly exercised its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment.
Having concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the dismissal motions, we address certain policy concerns regarding the detection of prospective registrants entering New Jersey from another jurisdiction. Our Supreme Court has acknowledged the goals of Megan’s Law “which focus on the need to protect society from sex offenders by disseminating critical information to the public.” State in Int. of C.K. (2018). N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 ensures this goal is met once the State determines the crime committed out of state aligns with a New Jersey Megan’s Law offense. Once that step is completed, the sex offender may elect to challenge the “similar to” determination as outlined in A.A. If the offender chooses not to challenge, or the challenge is unsuccessful, they have ten days to register in New Jersey or risk prosecution.
The record shows that each defendant arrived in New Jersey as a convicted out-of-state sex offender. Because they did not notify their former states that they were relocating to New Jersey, and they did not self-report to New Jersey authorities, they were present in this state unregistered, and essentially “undetected.” While in New Jersey, each defendant was arrested on unrelated charges which led to the discovery of their out-of-state sex crimes convictions. The State was unaware of defendants’ presence until they were arrested on unrelated charges and background checks were done.
These appeals, involving previously undetected out-of-state sex offenders, raise an important question: Can the State bypass its legislatively imposed duty to make a “similar to” determination for an out-of-state offender when that offender fails to seek proper authorization to leave their home state and secure permission to come to New Jersey? Put another way, does the less-than-diligent out-of-state offender, who fails to seek proper authorization to leave their home state and secure permission to come to New Jersey, waive their right to challenge a “similar to” determination before being charged here?
In keeping with our reasoning above, we conclude that the answer is no. The State, bound by the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(3), cannot ignore its duty to perform a “similar to” analysis, even for those offenders who fail to follow proper registration procedure to enter the state. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(3), the State must complete this analysis to establish an out-of-state offender’s obligation to register in New Jersey, prior to indictment, regardless of the circumstances under which the individual is detected.
Indicting defendants before affording them the opportunity to challenge whether their out-of-state conviction is similar to a New Jersey Megan’s Law crime offends principles of due process and the statute itself. As with any crime, the State retains the burden to develop cause for indictment for failing to register under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 prior to filing charges.
It is difficult to imagine an offense that would be a sex offense in another state, but not even “similar to” a sex offense in New Jersey. If there were, our Legislature would amend our Criminal Code accordingly or risk New Jersey being a sanctuary for certain sex offenders.
