Hearings to Contest Megans Law Classifications (Part 1)

by | Nov 10, 2024 | Blog, Criminal Law, Monmouth County, New Jersey, Ocean County

On July 2, 2024, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the Camden County case of In the Matter of Registrant R.S. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13 concerned the prerequisites for a sex offender to obtain an evidentiary hearing on their Megan’s Law internet registration classification.

Justice Fasciale wrote for a unanimous Court in relevant part: Recognizing that the parties agree they are bound by the Hoffman Consent Order, we hold that under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(b)(2), a Megan’s Law registrant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the registrant demonstrates there exists a genuine issue of material fact about whether the registrant’s conduct can be characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior.

To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the registrant must interpose more than general denials, self-serving assertions, bald declarations, or vague and conclusory claims. Objections to the State’s characterization that a registrant’s conduct constituted repetitive and compulsive behavior must be rooted in some reliable or credible evidence. Objections also must be material. “Materiality” bears upon whether the registrant’s conduct was clearly and convincingly repetitive and compulsive at the time the underlying sex offense was committed. Therefore, an objection must raise a genuine dispute about the registrant’s repetitiveness and compulsiveness. Whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing — and its scope — should be left to the sound discretion of the Megan’s Law judge, who should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying such a hearing.

“It is black letter law that where a material factual matter is contested, it cannot be relied on without a resolution of the disputed evidence.” State v. Hupka (2010). In the summary judgment context, a “genuine issue as to any material fact” requires more than just disputing “facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, ‘fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious.'” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. (1995). The facts disputed must be about an issue that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986) (defining materiality in the summary judgment context as dependent on the applicable substantive law).

Since “materiality” looks to the petitioner’s behavior at the time of the offense, their post-offense treatment is immaterial. Statements made by defendants during interrogations will often be the basis for findings of “repetitive and compulsive” conduct.