On January 13, 2021, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Somerset County case of State v. Walter Tormasi. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:44 concerned the constitutionality of a juvenile’s life sentence with 30 years of parole ineligibility. Judge Geiger wrote for the Court in relevant part: Defendant asks this court to extend the protections […]
Juveniles and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Part 6)
The New Jersey Supreme Court continued in relevant part: The Family Part judge’s credibility assessment and core factual findings — that D.M. “exposed his penis to Z.Y., sought Z.Y. to touch his penis with his mouth, and had his penis physically touch Z.Y.’s buttocks,” but that the State fell short of proving oral or anal […]
Juveniles and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Part 5)
Justice Patterson continued in relevant part as follows: There is no evidence in the endangering statute’s plain language that the Legislature intended to incorporate the penetration or age-disparity elements of the sexual assault statute, or the force or coercion elements of the criminal sexual contact statute, into the endangering offense. The Court does not agree […]
Juveniles and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Part 4)
The New Jersey Supreme Court continued in relevant part: The panel should have granted the State’s unopposed motion for oral argument, and the Court cautions appellate courts in similar settings involving expanded issues to seriously consider granting motions for oral argument, even when no party requested argument when it filed its original brief. The Appellate […]
Juveniles and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Part 3)
Justice Patterson continued in relevant part: The panel reversed D.M.’s delinquency adjudication, based on its resolution of the question it had raised sua sponte. Id. at 426-28. The panel acknowledged that “sexual conduct,” which would impair or debauch the morals of the child, was undefined in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). Id. at 426. It concluded, however, that […]
Juveniles and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Part 2)
The New Jersey Supreme Court continued in relevant part: In a written decision, the court made detailed credibility findings. The court found that the State failed to prove sexual penetration and accordingly declined to adjudicate D.M. delinquent on the charge of first-degree aggravated sexual assault. The court found, however, that the State had satisfied its […]
Juveniles and Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Part 1)
On May 14, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the Union County case of State in the interest of D.M. The principal issue involved the circumstances under which an endangering the welfare of a child charge could apply to a juvenile defendant. Justice Patterson wrote for a unanimous Court and held in relevant part […]
Constitutionality of Lifetime Parole Supervision for Juvenile Sex Offenders (Part 5)
Nevertheless, C.K. remains a sex-offender registrant. That tainted status has permeated various spheres of his life — professional, personal, and social. He often feels isolated and depressed. He has turned down opportunities for professional advancement for fear that his juvenile sex-offender registrant status will be revealed. He despairs that the permanent designation of sex offender […]
Constitutionality of Lifetime Parole Supervision for Juvenile Sex Offenders (Part 4)
The Court continued: Subsection (g) has the perverse effect of keeping on the sex-offender registry those juveniles who have completed their rehabilitation, not reoffended, and who can prove after a fifteen-year look-back period that they are not likely to pose a societal threat. When, in the case of juveniles, the remedial purpose of Megan’s Law […]
Constitutionality of Lifetime Parole Supervision for Juvenile Sex Offenders (Part 3)
Justice Albin continued: Even a lifetime presumption with a twenty-five-year look-back period has been found violative of some states’ constitutions. New Jersey’s lifetime presumption of dangerousness that attaches to juvenile sex offenders pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-29(g) is more extreme than the registration and notification schemes, as applied to juveniles, struck down by the Ohio and […]
