On July 7, 2025, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Middlesex County case of In Re Registrant S.O. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 concerned the proper considerations under the “public safety prong” for evaluating a motion to terminate Megan’s Law and CSL supervision.
Judge Vanek wrote for the Court in relevant part: “Proof of the commission of a later offense would be relevant to assess whether a person poses a public safety risk.” Ibid. Consistent with our decision today, the factual basis for and disposition of any parole or CSL violations, along with subsequent arrests, should be qualitatively evaluated by a trial court through a wide lens to determine whether registrants have established they are “not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others,” without limiting the inquiry to subsequent sexual offenses.
The trial court shall also evaluate the factual predicate for any restraining orders issued against a registrant, in determining whether they are likely to pose a threat to the safety of others. The legislative purpose underpinning the PDVA is “to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.” The Legislature has found “that there is a positive correlation between spousal abuse and child abuse.” For the trial court to issue a FRO, after finding a predicate act “the judge must determine whether a restraining order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from future danger or threats of violence.” Thus, an examination of the facts underpinning the entry of a TRO or FRO is required to determine whether a registrant has established they are not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others–including, but not limited to, review of trial transcripts, police reports, and judicial findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered after domestic violence proceedings.
A counter-point to the Court’s reasoning is that the relevant consideration in motions to terminate Megan’s Law or CSL concerns the “public” safety risk. A FRO is different in that it focuses on the risk to one person. On the other hand, FROs can be entered to protect not just the plaintiff, but the plaintiff’s children. And the issuance of multiple FROs in favor of multiple plaintiffs could demonstrate a “public” safety risk.
The Appellate Division continued in relevant part: The trial court shall consider whether a registrant’s contention that they no longer pose a threat to the safety of others is undermined by their tier classification, as informed through their RRAS scores. This inquiry contemplates an evaluation of the risk posed by a registrant’s tier classification predicated on RRAS scores, whether a registrant’s RRAS scores increased after the initial tiering, and whether the registrant ever availed themselves of the statutory procedure to modify their tier designation.
As to Megan’s Law and CSL termination hearings, “the rules of evidence shall not apply and the court may rely on documentary presentations, including expert opinions, on all issues.” Where testimony is not proffered and the record is comprised of expert reports and certifications, the trial court may accept or reject those proofs but still must assess credibility by weighing them accordingly to make the required factual findings. See State v. S.N., (2018) (noting “regardless of whether the evidence is live testimony, a videotaped statement, or documentary evidence, deference is owed to the trial court’s determinations of fact and credibility”); In re J.W.D., (1997) (outlining the trial court’s robust credibility determinations regarding expert witnesses). Plenary hearings shall be held in the sound discretion of the trial court to the extent there are factual disputes, requiring cross-examination of witnesses. See, e.g., Segal v. Lynch (2012) (requiring a plenary hearing to resolve “genuine, material and legitimate factual disputes”).
The trial court shall consider both Registrants’ termination applications anew, based on our decision today. The record shows that Registrants are Tier Two offenders, posing a moderate risk of re-offense, after review of their tier classifications over the years yielded increased RRAS scores. The trial court record is devoid of factual findings related to the increased RRAS scores, the risk tethered to their present tier classifications, and whether subsequent applications were filed seeking to lower Registrants’ tier designations. Nor does the record contain evidence that credibility determinations were made as to the expert opinions proffered by Registrants. The trial court shall also consider the factual underpinnings of the FROs entered against Registrants, along with any parole or CSL violations, evidence of subsequent non-sexual or sexual offenses, and other relevant facts as to the Registrants’ status at the time the motions were filed.
Based on a complete record, the trial court shall determine whether Registrants have met their respective burdens of establishing they are each “not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others,” sufficient to terminate their Megan’s Law and CSL obligations. We express no opinion on the outcome of the motions on remand. To the extent the trial court orders granted the State’s applications to stay pending this decision, those stays are vacated as moot in light of our decision vacating the termination orders and remanding both matters to the trial court.
