On May 14, 2020, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Bergen County case of State v. Derrick Lawrence. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5 was whether a violation of a child support work release curfew constitutes criminal Escape. Judge Mawla held in relevant part: As the Court noted in Pasqua, enforcement proceedings for the collection […]

Justice Timpone concluded in relevant part: Context is important for finding the verbal acts sufficient enough in this matter. Defendant’s decrees here — 1) instructing his girlfriend to text someone on his behalf to carry out the murder of A.A., 2) directing his cohorts to carry out the murder of A.A., and 3) demanding that […]

The New Jersey Supreme Court continued in relevant part: The Appellate Division’s requirement in this case that the State produce such evidence raises the level of proof required to establish a substantial step for criminal attempt. The Appellate Division’s implication that only direct evidence can support a substantial step flies in the face of our […]

Justice Timpone continued in relevant part: The Appellate Division incorrectly ruled that “without evidence of an act by defendant identifying a perpetrator and orchestrating the requisite course of conduct to culminate in the commission of the crime, the State’s proofs fall short.” Indeed, as we found in Perez, the standard for a substantial step is […]

The Court continued in relevant part: Regarding the second element, a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant took a substantial step toward the murder of A.A. when he expressly directed his girlfriend and cousin to contact people to kill A.A., as well as demanding that they post his bail so that he could kill A.A. […]

On May 13, 2020, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the Atlantic County case of State v. Quashawn K. Jones. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 was whether phone calls demanding the murder of an adverse witness constituted the “substantial step” required to support an attempted murder conviction. Justice Timpone wrote for a unanimous court […]

The Appellate Division concluded with the following: In sum, we fully appreciate the Board’s obstacles in preventing recidivism of its sexual offender parolees, especially considering the ever-expanding services available on the Internet, which makes the Board’s efforts more trying. Since our decision in J.B. I some mere seven years ago and the environment our Court […]

The Court continued in relevant part: Led by these rulings, we conclude imposing the social networking restriction on R.K.’s CSL sentence in 2007, which later became the regulatory social networking ban in 2010, violates his constitutional rights of free speech because his sexual offense convictions of lewdness and endangering the welfare of a child resulting […]

The three-judge panel continued in relevant part: In K.G., this court addressed the distinct challenges raised by four convicted sex offenders on Parole Supervision for Life (PSL) to restrictions on their use of the Internet. Being challenged were “regulations adopted after J.I. to establish new criteria and procedures for the imposition of a special condition […]

Judge Sumners continued in relevant part: Given our conclusion the CSL social media ban is facially unconstitutional, we are not required to address R.K.’s contention that the ban is unconstitutional as applied to him. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that based upon our rulings in J.I., and K.G., we conclude the social media ban […]