Relevant caselaw and analysis regarding release from Parole Supervision for Life (PSL) is as follows: Under current law, a person who violates the terms or conditions of the special sentence of community supervision without good cause is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. This bill clarifies that a person who violates a special sentence would receive a term of imprisonment, except for extraordinary cases where the court is clearly convinced that imprisonment would be a manifest injustice. In addition, the bill permits the State Parole Board to treat such a violation like any other parole violation. The bill also clarifies current law specifying that where the conduct underlying the violation of a condition of a special sentence is itself criminal, the State may prosecute that conduct in a criminal action in addition to revoking parole. Violation of conditions of supervision is not punished administratively as a parole violation but as a new crime of the fourth degree.
The parole board’s ability to impose additional conditions on a supervised offender is subject to due process protections. Jamgochian v. State Parole Bd. (2008). In Jamgochian, the Court concluded that prior to the imposition of a curfew, a supervised offender who has lived freely in society for some period of time is entitled to, at a minimum, reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond. Additional protections, such as a hearing and an opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses, would depend on the extent to which the offender denied the allegations giving rise to the conditions imposed by the parole review board. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that a supervised-for-life offender’s rights are not as extensive as the due process rights enjoyed by defendants at a criminal trial. Accord J.B. v. NJ State Parole Bd. (2017); J.I. v. NJ State Parole Bd. (2017). In State v. R.K., (App. Div. 2020), however, the Appellate Division held that under Packingham v. North Carolina (2017), the CSL’s total ban on internet social media use was unconstitutional facially and as applied to the defendant despite an “escape valve” provision.
Subsection c. of this section provides a mechanism for release from parole if the parolee has been offense free for 15 years. The use of the word, “may” indicates that the court has discretion as to whether to grant the relief. It is improper to include in the order reference to other states’ restrictions, since those vary and are not controllable by the court order. Matter of B.B. (App. Div. 2019).
