The Court continued in relevant part: The Legislature was acutely conscious of these burdens when it adopted N.J.S.A. 2A:62A-10 and 11. Through this statute the Legislature sought to encourage medical professionals who draw blood from DWI suspects to cooperate with police officers, who often need their immediate assistance, by easing their responsibilities as eventual witnesses. See Senate Committee Statement, supra. See also State v. DeFrank (observing that the statute was adopted “in response to the difficulties experienced by municipal prosecutors in securing the appearance of medical personnel at DWI trials and the concomitant strain those court appearances placed upon the affected medical professionals”). Consistent with those legislative aims, we believe it is appropriate to consider the potential hardship upon third-party witnesses that may result from enforcing defendants’ rights of confrontation in the post-Crawford era.
The judiciary has a recognized duty to be protective of third-party witnesses who may be called upon to recount their personal knowledge in court proceedings. For example, N.J.R.E. 611, like its federal analogue, vests judges with authority to protect witnesses from “harassment,” and to “avoid needless consumption of time.” See, e.g., U.S. v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 884-85 (1st Cir.1984) (upholding a trial judge’s limitations upon defense counsel’s cross-examination of a witness because it was needlessly cumulative and harassing). We also proscribe attorney conduct that is frivolous or designed to harass others. See R. 1:4-8. We further assure that fact witnesses called to court are reimbursed, albeit in modest amounts, for their travel expenses. See N.J.S.A. 22A:1-4.
We therefore do not wish the administration of the confrontation rights of defendants charged with DWI violations to impose undue logistical or personal burdens upon the law enforcement personnel and third-party witnesses who are summoned to testify concerning the contents of their hearsay declarations. To the extent feasible, the time chemists spend away from their laboratories and nurses spend away from their patients should be minimized. Toward that end, we discourage the pro forma insistence that such persons appear at DWI trials to vouch for the contents of their reports, if there are no bona fide subject matters in dispute on which defense counsel intends to cross-examine them.
Here, the Court is ignoring what live testimony revealed in this very case, despite the existence of the hearsay attestation that was supposedly “reliable.” Live testimony demonstrated an admission by the State that the blood sample was likely tainted by an alcohol swab.
