On June 10, 2026, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Camden County case of In the Matter of the Expungement of the Criminal/Juvenile Records of A.W. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 concerned a petitioner’s expungement eligibility while subject to Parole Supervision for Life (PSL).
Judge Augostini wrote for the Appellate Division in relevant part: Now, the question we must address is whether the completion of parole, including PSL, pertains only to the conviction for which expungement is sought. Based on our de novo review, the answer is no.
We first consider the plain language of the statute and its use of the term, “parole.” cf. Ardan v. Board of Review (2018). Pertinent to this appeal, the five-year provision begins to run from certain triggering events which include the petitioner’s “most recent conviction or satisfactory completion of probation or parole whichever is later.” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). The trial court found that the plain language of the statute required “finality of all such obligations,” and not only those associated with the conviction sought to be expunged.
This interpretation is consistent with the overall intent of the expungement statute; namely, to “provide relief to the reformed offender,” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32, who has “made a commitment to lead a law-abiding life.” Moreover, construing the statute in this manner is consistent with the terms of the “original laudable purpose, to wit, elimination of the collateral consequences imposed upon otherwise law-abiding citizens who have had a minor brush with the criminal justice system.” In re T.P.D. (Law Div. 1997. To lead a law-abiding life, as the trial court explained, “means to fulfill all obligations of court-imposed sentences” and not only those associated with or arising from the current expungable conviction. An individual subject to ongoing parole supervision as part of a penal sanction has not yet completed his or her penal sanction or demonstrated such a law-abiding life.
The rationale of the 1997 case cited by the Court is outdated and may have never been accurate in the first place. Most felonies, including second-degree offenses that require mandatory state prison sentences are expungeable. An offense requiring mandatory prison for even a first offender is not a “minor brush with the criminal justice system.”
The Court continued in relevant part: In 2019, the expungement statute was amended so that an individual with prior convictions is not barred from applying for an expungement. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) provides: Subject to the provision of subsection e. of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14 requiring denial of an expungement petition when a person has had a previous criminal conviction expunged, a prior conviction for another crime shall not bar presenting an application seeking expungement relief for the criminal conviction that is the subject of the application.
In amending the statute, the Legislature was aware of petitioners who had prior convictions for which they were not seeking expungement, or which were ineligible to be expunged. “There is a long-standing canon of statutory construction that presumes that the Legislature is knowledgeable regarding the judicial interpretation of its enactments.” In re Kollman (2012). Nonetheless, the plain language of the statute did not expressly limit completion of probation or parole to the “most recent conviction.” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a).
In terms of indictable offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), the Legislature purposefully chose to qualify “conviction” with the words, “most recent,” while no such qualifier was used when referring to satisfaction of “probation or parole.” If “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place yet excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.” State v. Cooper (2024) (citation omitted).
We see further support for this interpretation as the Legislature expressly defined the term “court-ordered financial assessment” to “mean and include any fine, fee, penalty, restitution, and other form of financial assessment imposed by the court as part of the sentence for the conviction or convictions that are the subject of the application” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). We agree with the State that had the Legislature intended to limit the completion of probation or parole to the convictions subject to the expungement application, it would have expressly stated so. “Courts should not add language to section (x) that the Legislature chose to include in section (y) but left out of (x). The reason is simple: the Legislature knows how to write a statute.” Matter of R.H. (2024).
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(a), a petitioner’s expungement petition may be denied when “any statutory prerequisite, including any provision of this chapter, is not fulfilled.” In other words, a person may be ineligible for an expungement at the time of the application if the petitioner remains on PSL. In this case, the petitioners are not eligible for an expungement because at the time of their applications, they were on parole, i.e., PSL. To suggest otherwise, would eviscerate the “punitive” sanction petitioners acknowledge they remained subject to. Indeed, had the Legislature intended to excuse persons on PSL from the five-year requirement, it would have expressly stated so. Based on our de novo review, we hold that the five-year provision requiring completion of probation or parole applies to the person and not to any particular conviction.
Petitioners contend the trial court further erred by finding under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b) that the State had “met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence, that the need for the availability of the records outweighed the desirability of having petitioners freed from any disabilities of their convictions.” They argue that this finding amounts to a “categorical bar to expungement relief on all persons subject to Megan’s Law registration status.”
If a petitioner satisfies the “requirements of the expungement statute by a preponderance of the evidence,” only then does the burden shift to the State to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a statutory bar or that the petition should not be granted.” In these cases, although petitioners’ indictable offenses presumptively qualified to be expunged under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), as explained in sections II and III, neither petitioner satisfied all of the requirements of the expungement statute because they remained on PSL and have not successfully completed parole. Therefore, the burden should not have shifted to the State to “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a statutory bar or that the petition should not be granted.” In re G.R. (App. Div. 2007)).
Nonetheless, under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(a), denial is required under these circumstances because neither petitioner can demonstrate that they fulfilled the “statutory prerequisite” under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) of the five-year expiration from the date of their “satisfactory completion of probation or parole.” Because this statutory prerequisite has not been satisfied, we need not go further and analyze whether the trial court erred in its qualitative assessment of “the need for the availability of the records” against “the desirability of having a person freed from any disabilities.” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b). We also need not reach petitioners’ remaining contention that the court abused its discretion by denying expungement relief under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(b).
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ expungement applications. We hold that the five-year ripeness provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), permitting an expungement application only “after the expiration of a period of five years from the person’s satisfactory completion of probation or parole” includes completion of PSL as a form of parole and is not limited to the offense for which expungement is sought. In other words, because N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) allows for an expungement application only after five years from a petitioner’s completion of parole, and PSL is a form of parole, we hold that completion of or termination from PSL is a prerequisite to filing an expungement application under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) regardless of whether it is associated with the offense for which expungement is sought.
