On November 18, 2025, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Essex County case of C.J.S. v. A.S. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-13 was whether a defendant step-parent barred from contact with the plaintiff’s children had a “child in common” relationship under the Victim’s Assistance and Survivor Protection Act (VASPA).
Judge Marczyk wrote for the Appellate Division in relevant part: The trial court determined it only had jurisdiction over the VASPA matter “if the parties could not be defined as victims of domestic violence” under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4. It explained it would not have jurisdiction if the parties had a “child in common” under the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). The court then noted, relying on D.V. v. A.H., (Ch. Div. 2007), while plaintiff and defendant do not “biologically” have children in common, “they do have step-children in common.” The court explained, while “child in common” is not defined in the PDVA, plaintiff and defendant were in a “family-like” setting. It ultimately found step-children fell within the meaning of a “child in common” under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). Therefore, the court concluded it had no jurisdiction over the VASPA matter, dismissed the claim, and vacated the TPO.
Plaintiff argues the trial court incorrectly relied on D.V. because defendant is not a biological parent and does not have any rights to parenting time as a step-parent. He maintains his allegations of cyber-harassment and stalking under VASPA did not arise in the context of parenting his children and cannot be “interpreted as familial in any way.”
In D.V., the court addressed whether it had jurisdiction under the PDVA in a matter involving an allegation the defendant biological father of a child committed an act of domestic violence against the plaintiff, his wife’s sister-in-law. The child was removed from the defendant and his wife on several occasions, and the plaintiff was granted legal and physical custody. However, the defendant was afforded parenting time. The plaintiff subsequently filed a PDVA complaint, alleging the defendant harassed and threatened to kill her.
The D.V. court held the parties had a “child in common,” for the purposes of the PDVA, because they shared a “family-like relationship” from being “judicially joined” to share in the parenting of a child. Because the plaintiff and her husband had sole legal and physical custody of the defendant’s child while the defendant maintained parenting time rights, the court determined the parties shared a “child in common.” Therefore, the court concluded it had jurisdiction under the PDVA and entered a final restraining order (FRO) against the defendant.
We conclude the trial court improperly relied on D.V. The plaintiff and the defendant there both had parental rights. The facts here are not analogous. Not only does defendant not have any parental rights, but he has also been barred from having any contact with the children for over five years. This is far afield from the “judicially joined” parties involved in D.V. Under these circumstances, we determine the parties do not have a “child in common” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), and plaintiff should have been permitted to proceed with his VASPA action.
Here, the defendant-respondent did not participate in the appeal. Since the protection orders at issue are superior court civil matters as opposed to criminal, an attorney was not appointed to handle the defendant’s side of the appeal. This was thus a one-sided appeal wherein the plaintiff represented by an attorney prevailed against the defendant who did not even attempt to represent himself.
