The United States Supreme Court majority continued in relevant part: Other cases similarly have recognized that certain deadlines, if missed, do not deprive a public official of the power to take the action to which the deadline applies. See, e. g., Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U. S. 149, 171–172; Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448, 459, n. 3; United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 63–65. These cases involved timing provisions that did not specify a consequence for the public officials’ noncompliance with the prescribed deadlines.
Several features of Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) lead to the conclusion that the Rule is best understood as a time-related directive. First, its plain language contemplates flexibility regarding the timing of a preliminary order’s entry, providing the indeterminate command that a preliminary order be entered “sufficiently in advance of sentencing” “unless doing so is impractical.” This flexibility takes the Rule further away from the category of “rigid” and “inflexible claim-processing rules.” Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 13 (per curiam). Second, Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) does not impose a specific consequence for noncompliance, in contrast to other parts of Rule 32.2. See, e. g., 32.2(a). In the absence of such specification, courts typically “will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction” for noncompliance with a timing directive. James Daniel Good, 510 U. S., at 63. Third, Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) governs the conduct of the district court, not the litigants. Mandatory claim-processing rules ordinarily “require that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times,” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (emphasis added), and time-related directives typically spur public officials to act within a specified time. That distinction holds even in the examples that McIntosh identifies, and he has not identified a mandatory claim-processing rule that is analogous to Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B).
A fair compromise between the Court’s position and McIntosh’s is that “insolent flouting” of the Rule should have a consequence. If a Court routinely disregards the mandatory language of a court rule there must be a sanction to encourage respect for the law.
