The Compassionate Release Act and Physical Exams

by | Dec 11, 2025 | Blog, Criminal Law, Monmouth County, New Jersey, Ocean County

On July 28, 2025, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of M.R. v. Department of Corrections. The principal issue concerned whether a physical examination is required for a medical diagnosis to be rendered regarding the Compassionate Release Act.

Justice Hoffman wrote for the unanimous Court in relevant part: In this case, the Court reviews the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e, and its implementing regulation, N.J.A.C. 10A:16-8.6, to determine whether physicians retained by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) are required to conduct a physical examination to render an acceptable medical diagnosis for inmates applying for compassionate release. Additionally, the Court examines whether it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for the DOC to deny appellant M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility in August 2023.

On August 20, 2020, while serving a prison sentence for racketeering, M.R. was examined in person by Dr. Javier Taboada because he was having trouble maintaining balance and writing legibly. The following day, M.R. was admitted to St. Francis Medical Center for a neurological evaluation, and he was subsequently diagnosed with a malignant form of brain cancer. In January 2021, M.R. underwent surgery to remove the malignant tumor. On November 16, 2022, M.R. visited Dr. Geetha Hrishikesan for a chronic care consultation. The physician noted that M.R. was wheelchair-bound and suffered from “residual neurologic deficits.”

In February 2023, M.R. applied for compassionate release. The DOC designated Drs. Jeffrey Pomerantz and Ruppert Hawes to provide attestation reports regarding M.R.’s medical diagnosis. Neither physician conducted an in-person physical examination of M.R., but instead relied on M.R.’s electronic medical record, including the report by Dr. Taboada from 29 months earlier. Dr. Pomerantz determined that M.R. was not physically incapacitated but concluded that M.R. did suffer from a terminal condition. Dr. Hawes also determined that M.R. did not suffer from a permanent physical incapacity but concluded that M.R.’s condition was not terminal. Dr. Herbert Kaldany, acting on behalf of the DOC’s health services medical director, reviewed the physicians’ attestation reports and concluded that M.R. was not eligible for compassionate release.

On February 27, 2023, Lisa Palmiere, Director of Classification of the DOC’s Division of Operations, issued the DOC’s final administrative decision, informing M.R. that he was ineligible for compassionate release. M.R. appealed and, in August 2023, the Appellate Division remanded to allow the DOC to reevaluate M.R.’s eligibility in light of Dr. Pomerantz’s and Dr. Hawes’s conflicting terminality prognoses. On August 22, 2023, Drs. Pomerantz and Hawes provided updated reports, now uniformly concluding that M.R. did not suffer from a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity. Once again, both physicians relied solely on M.R.’s electronic medical record. Based upon the updated attestations, Dr. Kaldany again concluded that “there is no evidence that M.R. is suffering from a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity.” On August 24, the DOC denied M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility for the second time.

On April 19, 2024, the Appellate Division affirmed the DOC’s decision to deny M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility. The court concluded that the CRA does not require physical examinations and that the denial was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In May 2024, M.R. petitioned for certification. M.R. died the next month, but the Court granted certification and reviews the case although moot because the issue raised is of substantial importance and capable of repetition yet evading review.

Based on the CRA’s plain language, as well as the legislative history and fundamental purpose of compassionate release, the Court agrees with the Appellate Division that physical examinations are not statutorily mandated to render a medical diagnosis that complies with the statute. The Court concludes, however, that the DOC’s decision to deny M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility in August 2023 was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Every applicant seeking compassionate release must be examined for both a terminal condition and a permanent physical incapacity. In this instance, the medical records relied upon by the DOC’s attesting physicians, as well as their corresponding explanations, were insufficient to support the agency’s conclusion that M.R. did not suffer from such a physical incapacity.

The CRA reflects the Legislature’s intent to show compassion to people with serious medical needs, decrease the prison population, and reduce healthcare costs for correctional facilities by broadening the number of inmates who could apply for compassionate release and by transferring the power to grant release from the Parole Board to the courts. Before inmates can petition the court for release, however, they must first obtain a Certificate of Eligibility from the DOC. The Certificate requires a diagnosis by two licensed physicians. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(b). Should the physicians indicate that an applicant suffers from either a terminal condition or permanent physical incapacity, the DOC’s Division of Operations “shall promptly issue to the inmate a Certificate of Eligibility.” Upon issuance, an inmate may petition for compassionate release. The CRA does not expressly require that an attesting physician’s “diagnosis” be based on a physical examination; rather, it is silent as to the process attesting physicians must follow to render their diagnoses. And although N.J.A.C. 10A:16-8.6, the relevant implementing regulation, references an “examination,” it too is silent as to the nature of the examination required.

Reviewing the plain language of the statute and regulation and the meanings of the terms they contain, the Court does not find that either implicitly requires a physical examination. Moreover, in other statutes and regulations, the type of examination required has been specified, but that was not done here; the word “physical” could have been but was not added, and the Court will not read that requirement into the statutory or regulatory text.

Although physical examinations are not mandated under either the CRA or its regulatory scheme, the Court cannot conclude that the DOC’s August 2023 decision to deny M.R. a Certificate of Eligibility was supported by substantial credible record evidence. The medical entries relied upon by the DOC medical director and the DOC’s designated physicians did not provide an adequate foundation upon which to conclude that, as of August 23, 2023, M.R. was not permanently physically incapacitated. Likewise, the physicians’ corresponding reports and the medical director’s memorandum do not allow for meaningful appellate review. Due to the potential for dynamic and unpredictable changes in the condition of inmates suffering from rapidly declining physical or mental health, contemporaneity is essential, particularly for a statute written in the present tense: N.J.S.A. 30:4 123.51e(b) requires a determination of “whether the inmate is eligible for compassionate release.” Given that, as early as September 2020, M.R. suffered from “progressive” and “residual” neurological deficits and struggled with several of the relevant activities of basic daily living, the DOC and its attesting physicians should have ascertained the current state of M.R.’s physical condition before concluding that he was not physically incapacitated as of August 2023. M.R.’s February 2023 application similarly underscores the timeliness problems inherent in the DOC’s implementation of the CRA.

Moreover, the physicians’ August 2023 attestation reports provided insufficient explanation for why M.R. did not suffer from a permanent physical incapacity; each simply stated, “No — does not require 24-hour care.” That denies the opportunity for meaningful appellate review.

Under the Medical Parole Act. convictions for certain violent and gun-related offenses were bars to release.  There are no offenses that bar parole applications under the Compassionate Release Act.  Petitioners must prove to the trial court by clear and convincing evidence that they are “terminal” or “permanently physically incapacitated.” “Permanently physically incapable of committing a crime if released” does not mean any crime, but means that the inmate is physically incapable, alone or with the assistance of another, of committing either the same crime or crimes of which he was previously convicted, or crimes like those of which he was convicted.