On November 24, 2025, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Pitts v. Mississippi. The principal issue concerned the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
This was a “per curiam” opinion. “Per curiam” opinions are supposed to involve such a straightforward application of the law to the facts that there is no room for an individual justice’s analysis. Thus, no justice’s name is attached to the opinion.
The Court wrote in relevant part: Ordinarily, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause “guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, 1016 (1988). In child-abuse cases, however, that rule sometimes gives way. Consistent with the Sixth Amendment, a court may screen a child witness from the defendant when “necessary to protect the child from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 857 (1990). Still, before invoking this procedure, a court must proceed with care. It must “hear evidence” and make a “case specific” finding of “the requisite necessity.” Simply pointing to a state statute that authorizes screening, even one premised on “generalized findings” of necessity, will not suffice. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court departed from these principles, we reverse.
Inherent in a finding that a child witness can testify through a screen is a finding that there is an enhanced likelihood that the defendant committed a crime involving the child. An inherent prejudice to the defendant in such cases is that jurors will presume that there is a basis for the screen related to the defendant’s wrongdoing. A jury instruction to the contrary seems unlikely to neutralize the inherent prejudice.
In May 2020, A. G. C. spent a weekend visiting her father, Jeffrey Pitts. After returning home, A. G. C. told her mother that she had been sexually abused. Eventually, that report led to criminal charges against Pitts. At trial, the State moved for permission to place a screen between A. G. C. and Pitts when she took the witness stand. In support of its motion, the State pointed to a Mississippi statute providing that child witnesses “shall have the right to a properly constructed screen that would permit the judge and jury in the courtroom to see the child but would obscure the child’s view of the defendant.” Pitts objected. He did not question the statute’s mandatory terms. But, he said, those terms had to give way to the Sixth Amendment’s demands. And, he submitted, the State had not attempted to meet, and could not meet, its Sixth Amendment burden of showing that screening was necessary in the circumstances of his case.
The trial judge granted the State’s motion. In doing so, the judge reasoned that the “statute appears to be mandatory,” and expressed “concerns about his ability to declare the statute unconstitutional and fail to follow it.”
After a jury convicted him, Pitts appealed. Invoking Coy and Craig, he argued that the trial court had failed to make the case-specific finding of necessity the Sixth Amendment requires and, as remedy, sought a new trial. Ultimately, a divided Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Pitts’s arguments. The court did not dispute that the trial court failed to make a case-specific finding of necessity. Instead, the court sought to distinguish Coy and Craig on various grounds. With those distinctions in hand, the court then proceeded to hold that Mississippi’s mandatory statute provided sufficient authority for the screening in this case. Unpersuaded, a dissent argued that Coy and Craig controlled this case and that the trial court failed to comply with their terms. After the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled, Pitts sought certiorari.
Under Coy and Craig, a trial court may not deny a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to meet his accusers face to face simply because a state statute permits screening. Nor may a court authorize screening based on “generalized findings” of necessity underlying such a statute. Coy, 487 U. S., at 1021. Instead, the Sixth Amendment tolerates screening in child-abuse cases only if a court “hears evidence” and issues a “case-specific” finding of “the requisite necessity.”
The Mississippi Supreme Court attempted to avoid these constraints by distinguishing Coy and Craig in various ways. But none of the court’s distinctions persuades. Consider the most salient theories it pressed: First, the court pointed to a victims’ rights provision in Mississippi’s State Constitution. That provision affords the state legislature the power “to enact laws to protect the rights guaranteed to victims.” And, the court observed, the state legislature exercised this power when it adopted the mandatory screening law the trial court applied in this case. 405 So. 3d, at 1249. But true as all that may be, it is also irrelevant. When state law conflicts with the Federal Constitution, the latter controls. Art. VI, cl. 2. And under the Sixth Amendment, neither state screening statutes, nor the “generalized findings” on which they are premised, are enough to overcome a defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation.
Second, the court stressed that Mississippi’s statute mandates screening in child-abuse cases while the Iowa statute in Coy only afforded trial courts discretion to screen. But, if anything, the fact that Mississippi’s statute is mandatory—and thus never requires a case-specific finding of necessity—renders it “more constitutionally problematic than the statute at issue in Coy, not less so.”
Third, the court emphasized that A. G. C. was four years old at the time of trial. But Craig involved a 6-year-old witness. And though a witness’s age is a relevant consideration, Craig made plain that a court must “hear evidence” and make a “case-specific” “finding of necessity” before denying a defendant the right to face-to-face confrontation in a child abuse case.
Fourth, the court observed that in Coy the government and the defendant disputed who committed the alleged as sault, while in this case the identity of the alleged perpetrator was not in question. But the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accusers face to face does not only apply in cases where identity is at issue. Nor does Craig’s exception for child-abuse cases automatically apply just because identity happens to be uncontested.
Finally, the court noted that the child witness and lawyers in Craig were placed in a different room from the defendant, with cross-examination conducted over closed-circuit television. In this case, by contrast, everyone remained in the courtroom, the witness and defendant separated only by a screen.
But both approaches deviate from the Sixth Amendment’s usual rule that a defendant is entitled to meet his accusers “face to face.” And both thus require a case-specific finding of necessity. Before this Court, the State does not so much defend the Mississippi Supreme Court’s various efforts to distinguish Coy and Craig as press a different argument still. As the State sees it, the trial court did “hear evidence” and make a “case-specific” “finding of necessity.” We disagree.
At trial, to be sure, the prosecution represented that A. G. C.’s guardian believed it would be difficult for her to testify face to face with her father. But the prosecution expressly rejected the notion that it had “to put on any proof,” choosing to rely instead on Mississippi’s mandatory “right” to screening. And the trial judge proceeded to rule that the “statute appears to be mandatory” and expressed concerns about “failing to follow it.” Those arguments and conclusions fall well short of the procedures and findings Coy and Craig require.
Having resolved that much, we pause to underscore what we leave unresolved. Just because a constitutional error took place at trial does not necessarily mean a new one must be held. Even constitutional errors are sometimes subject to a “harmless-error” rule and do not require a new trial if the prosecution can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” This Court has held that the denial of the right to face-to-face confrontation is among those errors “subject to that harmless-error analysis.” Accordingly, on remand the State remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free to consider, whether the error in this case warrants a new trial under the harmless-error standard. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
It is difficult to imagine how the “harmless-error” analysis can be conducted without guesswork. Even if the jury could be asked about the effect that the screen had on them, any effect would be speculative unless it could be compared with the same witness testifying without a screen. Since that never occurred, any “harmless-error” analysis seems speculative.
