On March 19, 2026, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Hudson County case of State v. Jahmere Glover. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1 concerned the constitutionality of 21 as the minimum age for gun possession.
Presiding Judge Gilson wrote for the Appellate Division in relevant part: Guarding against the impulsive behavior of people under the age of twenty-one is consistent with how people in 1791 viewed all people under twenty-one as minors. In other words, in 1791 people under twenty-one were subject to restrictions that did not apply to persons over the age of twenty-one and the Founders would have accepted that the States can restrict gun use by minors for reasons of public safety. Accordingly, New Jersey’s age restrictions on the purchase and possession of handguns are consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of restricting minors’ access to guns for public safety.
Looking to the original intent of the framers of the U.S. Constitution is one of several common methods used to analyze constitutional issues. It is a method associated with conservative judges. Justice Scalia was a well-known proponent of looking to the original intent of the framers.
The Appellate Division continued in relevant part: How N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1 burdens the right to purchase and possess handguns by persons under the age of twenty-one is also consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. The cases that have addressed age restrictions on gun purchase and possession have focused on two recognized uses of firearms by persons under the age of twenty-one in the Founding era. Those uses included serving in the militia and as permitted by a parent or guardian. See Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1120 (recognizing the vast majority of states required parents to provide minors with firearms for militia service); Accord McCoy, 140 F.4th at 578 (noting that minors had access to firearms owned by their families); see also Reese, 127 F.4th at 596 (acknowledging examples of “regulations and practices from near the Founding that asserted parental or supervisory authority over arms-bearing by eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds”). Other cases discuss hunting as another recognized use.
New Jersey’s age restriction statute permits those uses, as well as others. New Jersey law expressly allows persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty to possess and use guns if they are in the military or if they are in “the actual presence or under the direct supervision of” a parent or guardian. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1(b)(1). N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1 also allows persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty to use guns for purposes of hunting, military drill, competition, target practice, instruction, and training when done under appropriate supervision. See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1(b)(1)-(4). In short, all the recognized uses of a firearm by someone ages eighteen to twenty that existed in 1791, are permitted under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1. Thus, those exceptions align with how the Founders in 1791 treated people under the age of twenty-one.
A strong counterargument is that adults should be able to protect their families inside their homes. It is not uncommon for twenty-year-olds to own or rent homes and live with their children.
Judge Gilson continued in relevant part: What N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1 restricts is the unsupervised purchase and possession of a handgun in public. Those limited restrictions would have been recognized as the type of restrictions a state could impose on people under the age of twenty-one in 1791 consistent with the Second Amendment. See Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1123 (holding an age restriction statute constitutional because it did not “burden the right any more than historical restrictions because it preserved exceptions for minors’ use of firearms in certain contexts”); see also id. at 1125 (explaining that the Second Amendment does not “turn on an evolving standard of adulthood that is divorced from the text of the Amendment and from our regulatory tradition”).
The Founding era’s understanding is reflected in the laws enacted in the nineteenth century. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained: “The laws from the mid-to-late nineteenth century make explicit what was implicit at the Founding: laws may regulate the purchase of firearms by minors. To that end, eighteen jurisdictions expressly prohibited the sale of certain arms to individuals under the age of twenty-one and attached criminal penalties to those prohibitions.” Id. at 1124 (citing to the various state statutes).
In relying on these laws from the mid-to-late nineteenth century, we are following the directions of the United States Supreme Court as explained in Rahimi and Bruen. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 696 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 56 n.23) (relying in part on nineteenth century amendments to surety laws to understand what type of restrictions would be accepted as consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of gun regulations); Bruen, 597 U.S. at 64-65 (analyzing reconstruction-era state public carry laws to support its conclusion there were no historical analogs to New York’s proper-cause requirement). See also Lara, 125 F.4th at 441 (explaining “post-ratification history can confirm a court’s understanding of Founding era public meaning”). In other words, the starting place is the understanding in 1791. That states thereafter regulated the purchase and possession of firearms by people under the age of twenty-one, reflects how people in the Founding era understood those rights.
In summary, we affirm the part of the February 28, 2025, order that denied defendant’s motion to dismiss count two. We reverse and vacate the part of the order that dismissed count three. Because count three is constitutional we remand with instruction that count three be reinstated. We do not retain jurisdiction.
