The Appellate Division continued in relevant part: Defendant attempts to distinguish Cuccurullo because it was “in the context of applying motor vehicle penalties” rather than criminal penalties under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26. This distinction is immaterial in the present context, as the crux of the Cuccurullo decision was to determine the meaning of “under suspension issued pursuant to N.J.S.A 39:4-50.”
Like the statutory language interpreted in Cuccurullo, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b)’s language addresses conduct occurring “‘during the period of license suspension’ . . . if the actor’s license was suspended . . . for a second or subsequent violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.” N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). The statutes’ shared purpose is “to discourage individuals from driving from the moment their DWI license suspensions are imposed until after they have served the DWI suspension.” The Supreme Court noted there is no meaningful distinction between the language in the two statutes, because “although N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 and N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 are not found within the same title of the Code, they operate in tandem to establish escalating consequences for the same conduct–driving while suspended–based on a defendant’s number of past DWI or Refusal convictions.” State v. Konecny (2022).
Our interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) is also guided by the Legislature’s intent to prevent “fatal or serious accidents that had been caused by recidivist offenders with multiple prior DWI violations, who nevertheless were driving with a suspended license,” but also to avoid an irrational result. See State v. Haliski, (1995) (“Whatever be the rule of statutory construction, it is subordinate to the goal of effectuating the legislative plan as it may be gathered from the enactment ‘when read in full light of its history, purpose and context.'”
Defendant’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) would allow a defendant under suspension with multiple DWI convictions to avoid the custodial penalty intended by the Legislature simply because of a significant prior history of suspensions that must be served and completed before the DWI-related suspension period. We decline to adopt this cramped reading of the statute. A defendant completing service of a license suspension term for a prior traffic or criminal offense, which precluded the commencement of an imposed license suspension following multiple convictions for DWI, is subject to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 and the criminal penalties intended to punish such conduct.
Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. To the extent we have not otherwise addressed defendant’s arguments, they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
The defense would have had to file leave to appeal for the Appellate Division to address this case. That is because the case is still at the pretrial and has not otherwise been resolved. Our Court Rules permit the Appellate Division to deny leave to appeal without an explanation.
