On July 9, 2026, a unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court decided the Bergen County case of State v. R.F.P. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 concerned whether the defendant made a sufficient showing for an in camera review of the alleged victim’s mental health records.
Justice Fasciale wrote for the Court in relevant part: Reviewing the record as a whole, we discern no abuse of discretion with the trial judge’s determination that defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a connection between Kim’s pre-incident mental health conditions and her inability to perceive, recall, or recount the events of the alleged assault, or a proclivity to imagine or fabricate the alleged assault. Reviewed in its entirety, defendant’s proffered evidence shows: Kim has specific mental illness diagnoses; Kim received treatment for her mental illnesses at several psychiatric facilities; Kim checked out of the most recent facility against medical advice; Kim is prescribed medication for her mental illnesses; Kim may not have been medication-compliant at the time of the alleged assault; Kim’s friends and family describe her as having “a tendency to lie” and as someone who, due to her mental illnesses, may not appreciate the consequences of lying; Kim demonstrated an inability to accurately recount past events; Kim provided conflicting accounts regarding details of the alleged assault; and Kim’s mental illnesses can produce the types of testimonial incapacities she has demonstrated.
As defense counsel acknowledged at oral argument, if each piece of evidence was viewed on its own, it would not constitute a substantial, particularized need. But we do not look at each piece in a vacuum — we analyze how each piece of evidence relates to another to determine whether a defendant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, Chambers‘ requisite connection between the victim’s mental illness and the purported testimonial incapacity.
Here, collectively, the evidential record amounts to more than bald assertions that Kim’s mental illnesses may affect her ability to perceive, recall, or recollect the assault, or may indicate a proclivity to fabricate it. Accordingly, defendant established a substantial and particularized need for Kim’s pre-incident mental health records and thereby satisfied the first prong of the Chambers analysis.
The second prong requires defendant to prove that the information sought is both relevant and material. To be relevant, the alleged mental illness of a sexual assault victim must have a ‘tendency in reason to prove or disprove’ an ability to perceive, recall, or recount the alleged assault, or a proclivity to imagine or fabricate it.
The question of materiality turns on “the relation between the propositions that the evidence is offered to prove and the issues in the case.” State v. Williams (2019) (quoting 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 994 (7th ed. 2013)). “A material fact is one which is really in issue in the case.” State v. Buckley (2013). Just as a victim’s general ability to perceive, recall, or recount an alleged assault may be relevant evidence of a victim’s alleged mental illness, it may be material to the limited extent that it calls into question the accuracy of a victim’s version of events or, more fundamentally, whether the events that a victim alleges even took place.”
The central question in this case is whether defendant reasonably believed that Kim freely and affirmatively consented to engage in sexual activity with him. The credibility of Kim’s versions of events is therefore critical to resolving that issue.
In ordering an in camera inspection, the trial judge reasonably relied on interviews from individuals who had intimate knowledge of, and experiences with, Kim. From that evidence, the trial judge drew a rational inference that Kim’s pre-incident mental conditions could affect her ability to perceive, recall, or recount, as well as her tendency to imagine or fabricate the alleged assault. Because the trial judge’s credibility determinations were based upon credible record evidence, the judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that defendant showed that the information sought is relevant and material.
The Appellate Division erred by substituting its own assessments for those of the trial judge and by disturbing the trial judge’s factual determinations as to the interviewees. Although the Appellate Division correctly noted that the interview summaries might present future credibility and evidential challenges, under N.J.R.E. 101(a)(3)(E), a trial judge may relax the rules of evidence at proceedings to determine the admissibility of evidence. Accordingly, because the record shows that information sought from the records may indicate that Kim has a proclivity to imagine or fabricate the alleged assault, the information is relevant and material to defendant’s defense.
Finally, under the third prong, defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the information sought is not available through less intrusive means. Here, in contrast to Chambers, where we suggested that the defense could “probe more about whether family members and friends have additional knowledge of the victim’s alleged mental illness,” defense counsel has already interviewed those who have information related to Kim’s mental conditions. Even with that information, defendant has demonstrated gaps in the evidence as to Kim’s mental illnesses and treatment. Particularly, there is no documentation available to defendant regarding Kim’s actual diagnoses or the types of medication doctors prescribed to Kim beyond her self-reported statements, whether Kim took those medications, her stays at the various psychiatric facilities, and whether Kim exhibited a propensity to fabricate or an inability to recall or remember events. Because the only way for defendant to reliably obtain such information is through Kim’s pre-incident mental health records, defendant has sufficiently established that the information sought is not available by less intrusive means. The scope of records to be produced for the trial judge’s in camera review is limited and narrow — only records from Kim’s two most recent hospitalizations at Virtua Memorial Hospital and Bergen Regional Medical Center will be available for inspection.
On this record, the trial judge did not err in finding that defendant demonstrated a substantial, particularized need for Kim’s pre-incident treatment records, that the records are relevant and material, and that the information could not be secured from a less intrusive source. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting an in camera review.
The reversed Appellate Division decision was a “per curiam” opinion. Per curiam opinions are supposed to involve such a straightforward application of the law to the facts that no judge has a basis to attach their name to the opinion since there is no unique analysis. In light of this unanimous reversal, the “per curiam” designation may have been the Appellate Division’s attempt to avoid having one of their names attached to a reversal.
