On October 29, 2025, a three-judge appellate panel decided the case of Jean Clau S. Wright v. State Parole Board. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 concerned whether the petitioner’s mandatory parole supervision (MPS) term began during his immigration detention or after his release.
Judge Lisa Puglisi, who was elevated to the Appellate Division from the Ocean County Superior Court, wrote in relevant part: We are satisfied the outcome here does not offend the notions of fundamental fairness articulated by our Supreme Court in Njango. In that case, years after his NERA sentence was imposed, we held Njango was entitled to 2,692 days of service credit, which the sentencing court had denied. The application of credits resulted in Njango’s immediate release from incarceration one year and seven months past his maximum incarceration date. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), seeking either a reduction of his MPS term or to withdraw his guilty plea.
In reversing our affirmance of the PCR court’s determination, the Supreme Court held Njango was entitled to relief under the fundamental fairness doctrine. Because “arbitrary government decision-making denied Njango a remedy for a wrong,” the Court found he was entitled to credit for the time he spent incarcerated when he should have been released to MPS. This outcome did not run afoul of the legislative intent because, in that case, “the objective of parole supervision–to protect the public from the risk from violent offenders–was certainly satisfied when Njango was mistakenly or erroneously incarcerated beyond the prescribed time for his release.”
Here, as the Board noted, Wright was not subject to incarceration beyond his maximum term because of arbitrary state government decision-making. Rather, he was detained and eventually released by federal immigration authorities. Because the fundamental fairness concerns implicated in Njango are not present here, its holding does not control the outcome.
We note, as a corollary to MPS, parole supervision for life (PSL) contains a similar provision requiring PSL to “commence immediately upon the defendant’s release from incarceration” unless “the defendant is serving a sentence of incarceration for another offense at the time the defendant completes the custodial portion of the sentence imposed” under PSL, in which case PSL “shall not commence until the defendant is actually released from incarceration for the other offense.” As with NERA, an offender subject to PSL remains in the custody of the Commissioner of the DOC and is supervised by the Board, subject to parole conditions. While not explicitly provided in the statute, an offender’s PSL term is tolled during civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. See In re Civ. Commitment of R.F. (2014) (discussing the PSL conditions imposed after the release of an offender civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act).
A sensible reading of the statute leads us to conclude the Legislature intended a NERA offender to serve the mandatory three- or five-year MPS term while in the community, not in federal detention. We therefore discern no basis to disturb the Board’s determination Wright’s MPS term was tolled while he was detained in ICE custody and commenced upon his release to the community.
Judge Puglisi alluded to the Appellate Division’s decision being reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Django case. It would not be surprising if the instant decision is also reversed. While the petitioner may not have been detained in federal custody due to arbitrary decision-making, he was still incarcerated against his will and ultimately released. If he could earn credits for time in the community during that period, it seems “fundamentally unfair” to deny him credits for time spent detained in a federal immigration facility.
