On October 10, 2025, Judge Fritch of the Ocean County Superior Court, Law Division (Criminal Part) decided the case of State v. Edward Lynch, Jr. This is a rare, published Law Division decision. Published decisions are usually reserved for Appellate Division and Supreme Court cases.
The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3 concerned whether the defendant was entitled to a hearing to challenge the Department of Corrections’ decision to deny his desire to serve his sentence at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for sex offenders.
Judge Fritch held in relevant part: This matter comes before the court on a motion to challenge an evaluation of the defendant provided by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 on August 8, 2025, which concluded that the defendant was not eligible for sentencing under the purview of the New Jersey Sex Offender Act. The defendant’s motion relies upon the recognized due process rights afforded to a defendant in challenging a classification by DOC that they are a persistent and compulsive sexual offender requiring sentencing under the NJSOA. The defendant seeks to apply these rights to challenge a DOC determination declining to make such a classification. The defendant asks this court to sentence him to a term of incarceration to be served at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC) for sex offender treatment in the absence of a DOC recommendation that the defendant meets the statutory requirements for such a sentence.
On May 19, 2025, the defendant pled guilty to count one of Indictment 24-12-1941, charging him with Distribution of Child Pornography, first degree, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(B)(5)(A)(1). In exchange for the defendant’s plea, the State agreed to seek a sentence of ten years New Jersey State Prison, with mandatory ten years parole ineligibility, parole supervision for life, and Megan’s Law registration, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23. Following the entry of this plea, the court referred the defendant to the DOC for a complete psychological evaluation on May 23, 2025, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1. On August 8, 2025, the DOC submitted the results of this evaluation (the Evaluation).
The Evaluation, prepared by Andrew Greenberg, Psy.D., a forensic mental health clinician with the ADTC at Avenel, concluded that: Based on a review of the available record as well as information solicited from the defendant during this examination, there is evidence of repetition for statutory purposes as the defendant]was viewing numerous items of CSEM (child sexual exploitation material) over an extended period of time. The element of compulsivity is less clear. The defendant’s offense behavior appears influenced by a chemically intoxicated state caused by crack cocaine, which he noted smoking habitually for a period of approximately five years, during the period in his life he was engaging in the instant offense behavior. The defendant denied any interest in CSEM, sexual or otherwise, prior to his using crack cocaine. When all relevant factors related to this case are considered, there is insufficient evidence to conclude the defendant’s offense behavior was in response to a compulsion independent of the influence of crack cocaine or other factors. Therefore, he is not eligible for sentencing under the purview of the NJSOA.
The defendant, through counsel, filed the present motion on October 2, 2025, contending that, despite Dr. Greenberg’s assessment in the Evaluation, there “is proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s conduct is characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior” and that they “must be sentenced to the ADTC pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-e)b).” The State declined to file a response and took no position with respect to the defendant’s motion. On October 10, 2025, the court heard oral argument from the defendant.
The defense likely argued that the defendant’s being subject to Megan’s Law and parole supervision for life is inconsistent with his being denied an ADTC sentence. The defendant likely sought an ADTC sentence because it is a common belief that he will be safer from fellow inmates if he is housed with sex offenders at the ADTC as opposed to a prison that houses non-sex offenders.
Judge Fitch continued in relevant part: While the defendant contends that, based upon their contrary psychological evaluations, the court may find the defendant’s conduct is characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior, he is willing to participate in treatment at ADTC, and must be sentenced to ADTC pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b), the statutory language clearly requires the recommendation of the DOC as a mandatory prerequisite to an ADTC sentence. Although the court can disregard a recommendation for ADTC sentencing with an independent finding by the court that an offender is not compulsive and repetitive and not sentence to an ADTC sentence, the statute does not provide a means for the court to sentence a defendant to ADTC without the appropriate recommendation of the DOC. In other words, the court may find, independently, that an offender is not compulsive and repetitive and ineligible for an ADTC sentence even if the DOC evaluation finds otherwise, but the court may not supplant a DOC finding that an offender is not compulsive and repetitive and ineligible for an ADTC sentence with the court’s finding of eligibility for such a sentence. The court may not sentence an offender to ADTC without the DOC’s recommendation for same as the statute explicitly requires the DOC’s recommendation as a requirement for such sentencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3(b). Even if the court held a hearing and concurred with the defendant that his conduct was repetitive and compulsive, the applicable statutes still require the DOC recommendation for this court to sentence the defendant to ADTC and there is no such recommendation in this case to permit the court to impose the sentence the defendant is seeking.
A valid point for the defense is that this holding gives the ADTC clinician who performs the evaluation unbridled discretion. Clinicians should at least be held to an abuse of discretion standard to avoid the risk of absurd results.
Judge Fritch concluded with the following in relevant part: Although the applicable statutes allow for the court to disregard a positive DOC finding of repetitiveness and compulsiveness and sentence a defendant pursuant to the remaining sections of the criminal code, they do not allow the court to supplant a negative finding in a DOC evaluation that does not find repetitiveness and compulsiveness in an offender’s conduct and sentence an offender under the NJSOA without first having DOC’s recommendation for same. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to for a hearing pursuant to Horne, to challenge the August 8, 2025, DOC evaluation issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:47-1 which found the defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the purview of the NJSOA is denied.
