Justice Alito continued in relevant part: The Government’s interpretation would treat state offenses “involving a controlled substance (as defined in the CSA)” like those federal offenses “under the CSA.” Petitioners’ interpretations, by contrast, would treat those federal and state offenses differently, i.e., the federal offense would remain an ACCA predicate, but the state offense would not.
The Government’s interpretation also best fulfills ACCA’s statutory objectives. In Congress’s view, defendants who have repeatedly committed ACCA predicate offenses are “especially likely to inflict grave harm when in possession of a firearm,” so ACCA imposes a higher punishment when they do so. Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. 360, 375. Because a defendant’s “history of criminal activity” does not “cease to exist” merely because the crime was later redefined, McNeill, 563 U. S., at 823, it makes sense to ask whether a prior offense met ACCA’s definition of seriousness at the time it was committed. Brown’s and Jackson’s contrary arguments misunderstand the theory on which ACCA is based. A prior drug conviction for an offense punishable by 10 years’ imprisonment augurs a risk of future dangerousness even if the drug is no longer considered dangerous. Indeed, in McNeill, the Court found “absurd” petitioner’s argument that a later reduction in the maximum sentence for his offense reflected a legislative judgment that his prior offense was less serious than previously thought. Id., at 822. The “subsequent change in state law” did not “erase the earlier conviction.” Id., at 823. And it was the fact of that earlier conviction—not the legislature’s subsequent judgment—that ACCA was concerned with, because that fact “demonstrated” the defendant’s “culpability and dangerousness.” Ibid. Pp. 9–12.
It is difficult to see what is “absurd” about the argument that a reduction in the maximum sentence for an offense reflected a legislative judgment that it was less serious than previously thought. That argument makes more sense than the converse position: that a reduction in the maximum sentence says nothing about the legislative judgement about the seriousness of the offense.
