Justice Alito continued in relevant part: Petitioners various other arguments are unpersuasive. Relying on the so-called reference canon, Jackson claims that ACCA “incorporates the schedules ‘as they exist whenever a question under ACCA arises.” Brief of Petitioner Jackson 32. The reference canon provides that a statutory reference to a “general subject” incorporates “the law on that subject as it exists whenever a question under the statute arises.” Jam v. International Finance Corp., 586 U. S. 199, 209 (emphasis added).
But a reference “to another statute by specific title or section number”—such as ACCA’s reference to 21 U. S. C. §802— “in effect cuts and pastes the referenced statute as it existed when the referring statute was enacted.” Ibid. Even assuming that there may be contexts in which references to specific statutory provisions may be considered general, it is hard to see the phrase “as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act” as anything but a specific reference. Jackson’s alternative argument—that his reading is required by the “settled legal principle” that “the law that sets the penalty for a federal crime is the law in place when the crime was committed”—simply begs the question what §924(e)(2)(a)(ii) means.
Brown suggests that present-tense language in ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug crime”—language such as “involving” and “as defined in”—indicates a present-day focus requiring courts to look to the drug schedules in effect at the time of federal sentencing. The Court rejected that approach in McNeill, holding that ACCA requires a historical inquiry into the state law at the time of that prior offense and that “use of the present tense did not suggest otherwise.” 563 U. S., at 820.
Jackson’s argument appears weak as it would also allow defendants to manipulate the ACCA statute. “Whenever a question arises” indicates that the date that a defendant files a motion determines how the ACCA should be interpreted.
