The New Jersey Supreme Court continued in relevant part: In In re Registrant H.D., the Court held that individuals who apply to terminate their Megan’s Law requirements must demonstrate they have been offense-free for fifteen years from the time of conviction for the predicate sex offense or release from a correctional facility, whichever is later. The fifteen-year look-back period does not reset after the commission of a later offense. Ibid. The same principle applies to juveniles convicted of an offense. We do not adopt the contrary statement in R.H.
We now apply the above principles to R.H. and T.L. Both were adjudicated delinquent of aggravated sexual assault. Because they were not convicted of an offense, subsection (f)’s first prong — the requirement to remain offense-free for fifteen years — does not apply to them.
To be eligible to terminate their Megan’s Law obligations, R.H. and T.L. must each satisfy the second prong and demonstrate they are “not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).
R.H. presented a report by a psychologist who evaluated him in October 2020 and concluded he “is not likely to commit another sexual offense” and “does not present a risk of harm to others in the community.” In light of the trial court’s ruling on the statutory question, the court did not reach or make a finding about whether he poses a threat to the safety of others.
T.L. presented a report from a psychologist who evaluated him in March 2022. She concluded that T.L. “presented a low risk of engaging in future acts of sexually inappropriate behaviors” and was “not likely to pose a threat to others in the community.” The trial court rejected T.L.’s application based on its understanding of the scope of subsection (f). The court “recognized” the psychologist’s conclusion but did not make a finding on that issue.
Accordingly, we remand each matter to the appropriate trial court to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that R.H. and T.L. satisfy subsection (f)’s public safety prong. Because we resolve these appeals on statutory grounds, we do not address arguments about whether the doctrine of constitutional avoidance should apply.
For the reasons stated above, we find that the first prong of subsection (f) — which requires proof that an individual has been offense-free for fifteen years — does not apply to R.H. and T.L. because they were adjudicated delinquent, and not convicted, of a sex offense. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand both matters to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The “doctrine of constitutional avoidance” states that whenever possible, a case should be decided on non-constitutional grounds. This is because constitutional questions require difficult analyses that would be more time-consuming an inefficient.
