And there is yet another reason for the judge to have avoided an unexplored, lock-step adoption of Carey. Carey caused two deaths and it was in that context that the Court gave expression to what it believed should ordinarily be imposed. Indeed, we view that particular fact – not present here, since defendant caused a […]

We also observe that this case differs from Carey in another significant way. Here, the State pursued and was able to convince a jury to convict defendant of first-degree aggravated manslaughter in causing the death of the nine-year-old Honda passenger. Consequently, in imposing sentence, the term imposed for that conviction was necessarily significantly higher than […]

In reversing our determination that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in imposing consecutive terms, the Carey majority left in place two seven-year consecutive terms – a fourteen-year aggregate term.  Here, the State urges our affirmance of three consecutive terms – consisting of twenty, seven, and five-year terms – an aggregate thirty-two-year prison term. How […]

In Carey, the Supreme Court expressed its view as to how these factors should be employed in vehicular homicide cases. There, the sentencing judge imposed consecutive seven-year prison terms for two vehicular homicide convictions; we reversed, viewing the imposition of consecutive terms to be an abuse of discretion. The Carey majority, in reversing our judgment, […]

To further explain, we note, as the Carey majority recognized, that the Criminal Code provides little guidance about when a judge may impose consecutive terms. The Code declares only that “multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court determines at the time of sentence.” To fill the void created by the Code’s silence, […]

On February 2, 2018, Judge Fisher wrote for a three-judge appellate panel in the Atlantic County case of State v. William Liepe. The principal issue was whether the court’s 32-year aggregate sentence so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience and require appellate intervention. The defendant was 62-year-old and received the aggregate sentence as a […]

Because the State never proved an essential element of the certain persons charge to the jury, we find that defendant’s conviction cannot stand. In so holding, we decline to apply the doctrine of invited error on which the appellate panel relied. “Under that settled principle of law, trial errors that ‘were induced, encouraged or acquiesced […]

Returning to the circumstances before us, defendant highlights that the State’s proofs at trial consisted of testimony only that defendant was convicted of third-degree offenses. Defendant adds that when the trial court instructed the jury as to the elements of the certain persons charge, the court told the jury that it had to find defendant […]