On January 23, 2025, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Essex County case of State v. Stephanie Martinez. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 concerned the propriety of a passion provocation manslaughter conviction when a jury also found that the State did not disprove self-defense regarding a separate murder charge.
Judge Jacobs wrote for the Court in relevant part: For a claim of self-defense to prevail under these circumstances, a jury must find that the defendant had an honest and reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to protect herself from serious bodily harm or death, and that defendant did not provoke the attacker. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) and (b)(2)(a); State v. Kelly (1984). Whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable is measured by what the jury, not the defendant, considers reasonable under an objective standard. State v. Handy (2013). Clear and correct jury instructions are essential to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. State v. Rodriguez (2008). Certain jury instructions are so crucial to a jury’s deliberations that error is presumed to be reversible. State v. McKinney (2015); State v. Jordan (1997). The instructions must plainly spell out how the jury should apply the law to the facts of the case. State v. Concepcion (1988). Our courts have long held that it is plain error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury that in all instances of homicide self-defense is a complete justification for murder as well as manslaughter offenses. State v. O’Neil (2014). “A person who acts in self-defense and ‘kills in the honest and reasonable belief that the protection of his own life requires the use of deadly force’ cannot be convicted of murder, aggravated manslaughter, or manslaughter.” State v. Rodriguez (2008).
Here, the trial court charged the jury that: The State has the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the defense of self-defense. If the State carries its burden, then you must allow the defense [sic]. If the defense [sic] does not [] satisfy this burden, then you must find the defendant not guilty of murder and passion provocation manslaughter and go on to consider whether defendant should be convicted of the crimes of aggravated or reckless manslaughter.
This charge misstates the law. Instead, the jury charge should have instructed that if the jury were to find the State failed to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt as to any of the homicide offenses, then the jury should so designate and, accordingly, find defendant not guilty of all homicide offenses. The jury would then move on to consider the remaining charges, except for the weapons offenses, since those counts are inextricably linked to each other and the homicide offenses. Because this fundamental precept was not conveyed in the jury charge or verdict sheet, the jury invalidly found defendant to have met the self-defense test for murder but not passion/provocation manslaughter. Based on those incompatible findings, we are compelled to reverse defendant’s conviction for passion/provocation manslaughter.
The Model Criminal Jury Charges do not include a sample jury verdict sheet for this relatively common scenario, nor any helpful commentary to guide judges and counsel. In this appeal, we reiterate that when self-defense is established as to one category of homicide, it applies to all other categories of homicide charged or otherwise permitted for consideration as lesser-included offenses. Thus, to ensure trial courts properly implement this precept and in the interests of justice, we recommend that the Model Criminal Jury Charge Committee consider creating a verdict sheet template consistent with our case law for use in all cases where self-defense is considered for more than one category of homicide.
We reverse defendant’s conviction for passion/provocation manslaughter. Defendant’s remaining points on appeal are addressed in the unpublished portion of this opinion.
This scenario is concerning for two reasons. It shows that a trial judge presiding over a murder case had problems conveying basic principles to the jury. It also shows that juries too often arrive at verdicts by compromise and subjective feelings as opposed to an objective application of the law to their fact-finding.
