On March 31, 2025, a three-judge appellate panel decided the Camden County case of State v. Frank Amang. The principal issue under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 concerned whether the trial court’s response to a jury question regarding corporal punishment and parental authority was a basis to reverse the simple assault convictions.
Judge Susswein wrote for the Appellate Division in relevant part: Defendant Franck Amang appeals his jury trial convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, endangering the welfare of a child, possession of an assault firearm, and possession of large capacity ammunition magazines. Defendant committed the assault and endangering crimes against his daughters. He contends the trial court erred when instructing the jury on child endangerment and improperly responded to the jury’s question regarding a parent’s right to use corporal punishment. After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal principles, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the child endangerment counts and thus affirm those convictions. However, the trial court did not adequately address the jury’s question concerning a parent’s authority to use corporal punishment in relation to simple assault, and on that basis, we reverse the simple assault convictions and remand for a new trial on those counts.
During its deliberations, the jury came back with a question: “Does corporal punishment fall under the scope of simple assault? Please clarify if even non-excessive spanking/beating as a way of discipline to your child is simple assault if child feels pain?” The trial court conferred with counsel on how to answer the jury’s question. Defense counsel requested the court to instruct the jury that “non-excessive spanking and beating as a way of discipline is not simple assault on the theory that corporal punishment is not illegal in New Jersey. That is clear under Title IX. And so, if it’s not illegal, then it wouldn’t amount to simple assault because it’s legal conduct.”
The State objected to the defense proposal, arguing, “it is up to the jury to decide whether it’s non-excessive spanking, and also whether it’s a means of discipline and whether it comes under simple assault. So, the State is asking that you merely reread the instruction on simple assault.”
Our review of the record shows that here too, the endangerment charges were based, at least in part, on the conduct constituting the alleged assaults. Specifically, defendant was charged in the indictment with three counts of endangering the welfare of a minor–one count pertaining to each of his daughters. The child endangerment counts alleged specific conduct constituting child abuse or neglect, including that defendant struck the children multiple times with a belt. That was the same alleged conduct constituting all but one of the aggravated assault charges specified in the indictment.
But even if we accepted the State’s argument that A.L.A. is distinguishable, the law is clear that “when a jury requests clarification, the trial judge is obligated to clear the confusion.” State v. Conway (App. Div. 1984) (citing United States v. McCall, 592 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1979)). In State v. Parsons, we noted that, “jury questions present a glimpse into a jury’s deliberative process.” (App. Div. 1994).
We explained: A question from a jury during its deliberations means that one or more jurors need help and that the matter is of sufficient importance that the jury is unable to continue its deliberations until the judge furnishes that help. An appropriate judicial response requires the judge to read the question with care to determine precisely what help is needed.
We do not believe the trial court “cleared the confusion” expressed by the jury by merely rereading the simple assault instruction that had previously been given to them–the very instruction that prompted their question. Here, the jury asked a direct question on the law and the trial court was obligated to provide a direct answer. We therefore conclude the court erred in its response to the jury question with respect to simple assault. We are not convinced, moreover, that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore are constrained to reverse defendant’s simple assault convictions and remand for a new trial on those counts (counts ten and sixteen).
The defendant was convicted of second-degree possession of an assault firearm. That carries a mandatory three-to-ten-year prison sentence and parole ineligibility. If that conviction remains after this case is appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, it is unlikely that the prosecutor’s office will choose to retry this case.
