On June 28, 2024, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Fischer v. United States. The principal issue before the Court concerned whether the sufficiency of the evidence that the defendant impaired the availability of evidence surrounding the events of January 6, 2021 at the Capitol building.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the 6-3 majority in relevant part: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” §1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on January 6, 2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the building, breaking windows, and assaulting police. This breach of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal complaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2). He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. To determine the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in §1512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its “surrounding words,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion), and “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of the statute.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539).
The rule of lenity is a statutory interpretation principal that calls for ambiguous penal statutes to be construed against the government. It is a rule that is supposed to be used sparingly since a skillful attorney can almost always find an ambiguity in a penal statute.
