Miranda Rights and Spontaneous Statements (Part 2)

by | Jan 5, 2024 | Blog, Criminal Law, Monmouth County, New Jersey, Ocean County

Justice Solomon continued in relevant part: Defendant was in custody at the hospital in light of the police presence around her bed area. But no interrogation or its functional equivalent occurred before her spontaneous and unsolicited admission. Miranda warnings were therefore not required, and defendant’s statement — that she “only had two shots prior to the crash” — is admissible at trial.

To protect a suspect’s right against self-incrimination, law enforcement officers must administer Miranda warnings when a suspect is in police custody and subject to interrogation. The parties do not dispute that defendant was in custody at the hospital. The sole issue is whether Detective Espaillat interrogated defendant in violation of his duty to first inform her of her right to remain silent.

The United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis clarified that “interrogation” for Miranda purposes occurs when a suspect “is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent,” which may include “any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). But the Supreme Court stressed that the police “cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.” Id. at 301-02.

In State v. Hubbard, the Court concluded that the defendant was interrogated by police because “the targeted questions reflected a clear attempt on the part of the detective to cause defendant to incriminate himself.” 222 N.J. 249, 272 (2015). However, in State v. Beckler, the Appellate Division upheld the admissibility of the defendant’s custodial statements because they “were unsolicited, spontaneous, and not made in response to questioning or its functional equivalent.” 366 N.J. Super. 16, 25 (App. Div. 2004). (pp. 13-16) 4.

Here, defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent when she stated that she “only had two shots prior to the crash.” No questioning occurred and Espaillat could not have foreseen that his introduction was reasonably likely to elicit an immediate incriminating response. Rather, defendant spontaneously made an unsolicited incriminating statement while in custody. The trial court and Appellate Division relied heavily on the three police officers in or just outside defendant’s bed area at the time Espaillat introduced himself. That fact alone may establish custody, but it does not establish interrogation.

Absent from the Court’s analysis is what the detective did foresee his introduction eliciting and what else he intended to say after his introduction. Also absent is what the other nearby police said to or within earshot of the defendant before the detective made his “introduction.”